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Personal smart devices provide users with powerful capabilities for commu-
nication, productivity, health, education, and entertainment. Applications often
operate over sensitive data related to the user: collecting and processing input data
from sensors (e.g., fingerprint scans, location updates), or rendering output data to
the user (e.g., display financial information). This sensitive data is the target of
many attacks, which range from malicious applications to compromises of the plat-
form software, which includes the operating system (OS) and privileged services.
Today, users are ultimately unable to control or reason about how their sensitive
data is processed, protected, or shared.
In this dissertation, I argue the following thesis: Introducing an enforcement
layer between the hardware and platform software can enable end-to-end secure appli-
cations while giving users fine-grained control over their devices. I support this thesis
through the design, implementation, and evaluation of two different instantiations
of such an enforcement layer: SeCloak and AIO. SeCloak focuses on addressing a
single point in the policy space for giving control back to users: on/off control of pe-
ripherals (e.g., camera, microphone). SeCloak runs as a platform-agnostic layer that
provides the abstraction of secure, virtual switches that the user can reliably config-
ure. AIO introduces a new “accountable path” abstraction that enables constructing
and reasoning about the end-to-end I/O stack between application endpoints and
underlying hardware devices. Accountable paths allow for more expressive policies
to be enforced over the software stack, which can be used to derive various assur-
ances over the data (e.g., confidentiality, provenance); principals can reason about
the state of the system through attestations provided by AIO over (parts of) these
paths. The guarantees provided by these enforcement layers hold regardless of the
correctness of the rest of the platform software (including the OS).
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Personal smart devices provide users with powerful capabilities by enabling a
rich set of applications and services in areas such as communication, productivity,
health, education, and entertainment. In many cases, users carry these devices
around with them at all times, enabling observation of much of the user’s virtual and
physical life. Such applications and services often operate over sensitive data related
to the user: collecting and processing input data from sensors (e.g., fingerprint
scans, location updates), or rendering output data to the user (e.g., display financial
information). Naturally, it is important for users to protect how their data is being
collected, processed, and shared.
The controls provided to users by existing platforms for managing how their
sensitive data is collected, processed, and shared are insufficient and brittle. Many
high-profile attacks have exposed this insufficiency; for instance, Android doesn’t re-
quire permission for applications to use the accelerometer, which could be leveraged
to determine sensitive keyboard inputs (e.g., PINs, passwords) [3, 4]. The Con-
trol Center in iOS disconnects, but doesn’t actually disable, WiFi and Bluetooth
radios [5]. More importantly, even when controls are available, they are brittle
because they rely on the integrity of the platform software, which is complex and
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presents a large attack surface, as demonstrated by frequent data breaches [6–13].
Beyond a lack of control, users are unable to reason about the software stack
that handles their sensitive data. This software stack ranges from the applications
to the hardware I/O devices themselves, which always serve as the sources and/or
sinks for this sensitive data. Even some hardware security features do not provide
complete assurance due to their reliance on software; for instance, notification LEDs
that are used to signal that the camera is in-use can be disabled by software-based
attacks [14, 15]. Identifying the precise set of software components and principals
responsible for handling the I/O data is challenging, as such information is not
currently exposed; additionally, the monolithic nature of most software platforms
significantly increases the size of the computing base included in the set. Finally, it
is not possible to determine the assurances that the platform provides over the I/O
data, such as confidentiality and integrity protections.
These problems actually extend beyond the end users themselves to other
stakeholders in the ecosystem. For example, consider a mobile banking application
that allows users to issue monetary transactions. The bank may require assurance
that the user explicitly confirmed the transaction prior to executing it; likewise,
the user desires the assurance that the amount they entered is actually used in the
transaction. If the OS, or privileged software for managing the display and keyboard,
is compromised, these assurances may not hold; for instance, a compromised OS
could issue fake inputs to the bank application to change the amount or the recipient
of the transaction. The status quo leaves both the user and the bank without
recourse: both must accept the facilities provided by the platform software and
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trust that they are correct and not compromised.
Existing mechanisms that provide protections for sensitive data rely on aug-
menting existing platforms with support for trusted execution environments (TEEs).
These TEEs support running isolated, trusted applications (TAs) and provide se-
cure access to hardware I/O devices. Commercial solutions [16–19] provide build-
ing blocks for applications, such as PIN input and biometric authentication prim-
itives. Prior research has focused on supporting trusted I/O channels to specific
devices [20–31], and providing supporting generic mechanisms for constructing chan-
nels to arbitrary devices [32–35]. Unfortunately, such solutions 1) require the adop-
tion of an all-trusted security principal that supplies the complete software stack, 2)
prevent other principals from extending (or replacing) the secure functionality, and
3) do not provide mechanisms for control over the secure functionality.
1.1 Thesis
Introducing an enforcement layer between the hardware and platform
software can enable end-to-end secure applications while giving users
fine-grained control over their devices.
I use platform software to refer to the operating system (OS) and any privileged
services or frameworks that run on top of the OS. I use the term users in this
statement to refer to both end users themselves, as well as other stakeholders in the
ecosystem (e.g., device manufacturers, platform providers, application principals).
Providing users with fine-grained control means that users should be able express
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policies independently from the rest of the platform software, and that these policies
can be applied to any portion of the I/O stack.
My work in this dissertation focuses on defining the abstractions and mecha-
nisms for the enforcement layer. The enforcement layer must be isolated from the
(untrusted) platform software and have the ability to mediate software accesses to
the underlying hardware devices. To achieve these properties, the enforcement layer
relies on enabling hardware mechanisms such as virtualization and/or security ex-
tensions. I provide a background on these mechanisms in Chapter 2, including a
detailed overview of ARM TrustZone security extensions which I leverage in proto-
type implementations of my own enforcement layers.
In addition to the primary goals for the enforcement layer defined in the thesis
statement, there are other secondary goals to consider. First, the enforcement layer
must be efficient, since many I/O operations require low-latency accesses and some
involve transferring large amounts of data (e.g., network, display). When no policies
are applied to a given I/O device, the overhead should be negligible. Second, the
enforcement layer should provide mechanisms that help promote code reuse, such as
from the existing platform software; applications should only need to provide their
own implementations of components when explicitly required by trust assumptions.
Third, the enforcement layer should support expressive policies that can be enforced
at any layer of the I/O stack, thereby decoupling policy from the mechanisms used
to mediate I/O accesses.
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1.2 Contributions
To support my thesis, I have designed, implemented, and evaluated two sys-
tems that act as enforcement layers: SeCloak (Chapter 4) and AIO (Chapter 5). In
my initial work on SeCloak, I focused on supporting a single, yet important, point
in the policy space for giving users control over their devices: on/off control of I/O
devices. Building off my experience from SeCloak, AIO sets out to provide a single
abstraction of an “accountable path”, which enables end-to-end secure applications
with first-class support for expressive policies. This dissertation is structured as
follows:
Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
I provide a background on hardware mechanisms and software techniques to
enable trusted and isolated execution, which our enforcement layer will require. I
discuss existing work and place it into context with respect to the contributions of
my own work. This discussion focuses on two broad categories of work: 1) support
for enforcing policies over I/O control and data, 2) enabling trusted channels to
securely interact with I/O devices, and 3) relevant OS architectures.
Chapter 3: Enforcement Layer
I motivate the introduction of an isolated enforcement layer by discussing dif-
ferent possible solutions and their issues. I discuss the goals for such an enforcement
layer in more detail, and then describe the trust and threat model that I consider.
Chapter 4: SeCloak: On/Off Control for Peripheral Devices
I describe SeCloak [1], an enforcement layer designed to support a single, yet
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important, point in the policy space: on/off control of peripheral I/O devices. For
example, journalists interviewing confidential sources may want to use the micro-
phone but reliably turn off the radios and GPS, and users may want to make sure
the camera and microphone are disabled during private meetings. SeCloak provides
a simple abstraction to users of secure virtual switches that they can use to control
the various peripherals on their device (e.g., microphone, camera). SeCloak acts as
a separate, platform-agnostic layer that can enforce the user’s policy settings even if
the rest of the system software, such as the OS and applications, are compromised.
Chapter 5: AIO: Control and Assurance Over Sensitive I/O Data
I describe the design of AIO, an enforcement layer meant to enable trans-
parency and expressive, end-to-end control over the software that collects, processes,
and shares I/O data. AIO implements a new “accountable path” abstraction that
resolves an impedance mismatch between the assurances and control desired by
users (and other principals) and the mechanisms provided by existing platforms.
Accountable paths handle multiple (mutually distrusting) principals, enabling fine-
grained delegation of trust and safe composition of software from principals that
may contribute different portions of the I/O stack. Accountable paths enable more-
privileged principals, such as the end user, to enforce policies over less-privileged
software components. These policies can be used to obtain various forms of assur-
ance over I/O data, such as confidentiality and provenance; AIO provides a way to
prove these assurances to principals through (remote) attestation.
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work
I conclude by revisiting the contributions of this work. I discuss future work
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first in terms of open technical challenges related to this work, namely with respect
to usable security and strengthening the foundations of trust in the enforcement
layers (SeCloak and AIO) that I presented. I also discuss future work in terms of
non-technical challenges related to the practical deployment of this work on con-
temporary devices.
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Chapter 2: Background and Related Work
In this chapter, I begin by providing a background in trusted and isolated
execution, both in terms of enabling hardware mechanisms the software systems
that are built on top. Next, I discuss related work that falls into three categories:
1) support for enforcing policies over I/O control and data, 2) enabling trusted
channels to securely interact with I/O devices, and 3) relevant OS architectures. I
put this prior work into context with respect to my work on SeCloak and AIO.
2.1 Trusted and Isolated Execution
The enforcement layer relies on enabling mechanisms from the underlying
hardware to: 1) isolate itself from all other software running on the system, and
2) mediate software-to-software and software-to-hardware interactions. Next, I will
describe hardware technologies and associated software systems that can be used
to achieve similar isolation and mediation properties. In particular, I focus on the
ARM TrustZone security extensions which serve as the basis to enable my imple-
mentations of SeCloak and AIO (see Sections 4.4 and 5.4 respectively).
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2.1.1 Virtualization Extensions
Hardware extensions for virtualization are provided by all the major CPU
vendors: Intel [36], AMD [37], and ARM [38]. Virtualization of the memory man-
agement unit (MMU) allows virtual memory of the host to serve as physical memory
of the guest. While these mechanisms handle memory accesses made by software
running on the CPU, they do not support virtualization of the memory accesses
made by DMA-capable I/O devices. Instead, input-output memory management
units (IOMMUs) are employed map device addresses to physical addresses. IOM-
MUs allow scattered memory pages to be treated as contiguous by the device, enable
devices to work with smaller address ranges than that of the system bus, and also
(importantly) provide protection against maliciously configured devices.
Many systems use hypervisors to protect secure applications from vulnerable
OSs. Overshadow [39] employs a hypervisor to protect applications from the un-
trusted OS through the use of multi-shadowing, where the hypervisor selects the
shadow page table to use based on the visible context (e.g., protection ring, in-
struction pointer). The untrusted OS is able to manage the memory resources of
applications, but only gets an encrypted view of user pages. The application itself
is able to operate on an unencrypted view of its pages. Inktag [40] and Sego [41]
additionally allow the isolated applications to safely make use of untrusted (but
verified) OS services for file storage and handling crash recovery. TrustVisor [42] is
a hypervisor that protects the integrity of code, as well as confidentiality and in-
tegrity of data, for security critical portions of an application. TrustVisor presents
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a “micro-TPM” interface to applications, providing functionality such as attesta-
tions and sealed storage that runs efficiently on the CPU as opposed to traditional
hardware TPM devices.
2.1.2 Security Extensions
Beyond virtualization, modern architectures include hardware security exten-
sions, such as Intel SGX [43], Sanctum [44] and ARM TrustZone [45]. These tech-
niques go beyond Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) that enable secure boot, or
Intel Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) [46] and AMD Secure Virtual Machine
(SVM) [47] that allow for attested execution of the OS or smaller code segments [48].
2.1.2.1 Intel SGX
Intel SGX [43] enables on-demand “enclaves” which protect the execution of
the software within against both hardware attacks (e.g., probing on the memory bus)
and software attacks (e.g., compromised OS or hypervisor). SGX attests to correct
execution via measurements of the initial state of the enclave (code and data), and
protects the confidentiality of enclave memory by transparently encrypting writes
(and decrypting reads) to (from) main memory. SGX enclaves have been used to
securely run existing binaries without modification by the OS [49,50], and have also
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Figure 2.1: High-level overview of ARM TrustZone SoC architecture.
2.1.2.2 ARM TrustZone
Figure 2.1 shows a high-level overview of the ARM TrustZone architecture,
with a particular focus on relevant security components.
ARM TrustZone [45] is a set of hardware security extensions that supports
hardware isolation of two “worlds” of execution: non-secure and secure. Each pro-
cessor core executes in the context of a single world at any time; the Security Config-
uration Register (SCR) contains the “NS” bit that denotes the current world state
of the processor core. In each world, the processor core may execute in different
privilege levels (PLs) in ARMv7 [52] or exception levels (ELs) in ARMv8 [53]; the
following discussion will assume the ARMv7 architecture. Both the non-secure world
and secure world may execute in PL0 and PL1, which correspond to user mode and
privileged modes (e.g., supervisor, IRQ, FIQ) respectively. The non-secure world
may execute in PL2, which corresponds to hypervisor mode. The secure world PL1
also contains a monitor mode, which is used for executing a secure software monitor
(discussed next).
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A software monitor, installed by the secure world, carries out all transitions
between worlds. These transitions are either explicit via the SMC instruction invoked
by non-secure supervisor-mode code, or implicit due to an access fault or secure
interrupt. The SMC instruction acts as a call gate mechanism for the non-secure
world to invoke a particular secure-world function. ARM provides a standard calling
convention [54] when invoking the SMC instruction that specifies the service (e.g.,
CPU, OEM, Trusted App) and an identifier for a function that belongs to the
service. The SCR register that contains the current world state also has a “EA” bit
that determines the behavior of external aborts, such as those caused by hardware
protection access faults. This bit controls whether the processor will switch to abort
mode or monitor mode on receiving the external abort exception. Similar bits exist
for IRQ and FIQ modes to configure interrupt behavior.
All accesses to memory and I/O devices are tagged with the “NS” bit, which
specifies whether the access was issued while the core was in non-secure mode. This
tagging enables hardware components, such as bus and memory controllers, to be
TrustZone aware and support access control based on the world performing the
access; we show several such devices in Figure 2.1. The TrustZone Address Space
Controller (TZASC) [55] mediates accesses to RAM, and can be configured to allow
or deny accesses to regions according to the world state and type of access (R/W).
The secure world OS can use the TZASC, for instance, to protect the parts of RAM
it uses from read or write accesses by the non-secure world. The Generic Interrupt
Controller (GIC) [56] is a TrustZone aware device that enables the secure world OS
to assign specific interrupts as either secure world or non-secure world, and supports
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limiting the priority of non-secure world interrupts (e.g., to avoid DoS attacks).
There are also manufacturer-specific IP blocks that are used to protect ac-
cess to peripheral devices, such as display controllers and peripheral bus controllers.
While these blocks vary in their exact instantiation from manufacturer to manu-
facturer, the functionality they provide is similar; in the following discussion, I will
focus on NXP’s Central Security Unit (CSU) block that they include in their SoCs.
The Central Security Unit (CSU) allows the secure world to configure access control
in two ways. First, the CSU provides settings to allow or deny accesses to devices
connected to the system bus based on the world state, mode state, and type of
access (R/W). Optionally, when the access is denied, the CSU can be configured
to deliver the fault to the secure world monitor to be handled. Second, the CSU
provides settings to determine the world state used to tag non-CPU, DMA-capable
devices’ accesses on the system bus. This setting can be used to constrain the ac-
cesses of DMA-capable devices that are managed by the non-secure world to prevent
the devices from reading (or modifying) the secure world memory.
In order to provision the system in a secure way, TrustZone provides support
for a secure boot chain [57]. A hardware root of trust, in the form of hash of a
public key stored in secure, one-time programmable (OTP) fuses, is used to establish
the chain of trust. A first-level boot ROM stored on the SoC executes after the
device is powered on (or reset). This boot ROM is responsible for loading and
verifying a second-level boot loader that is stored in external storage; the verification
is performed by checking the signature of the boot loader image against the public
key attested to by the hardware root of trust. The boot loader will subsequently
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load and verify the secure world OS, using either the same public key or a new
one embedded within the image of the boot loader itself. Once the secure world
OS executes, it can configure all of the hardware appropriately before subsequently
loading and executing the non-secure world boot loader and OS.
Unlike SGX, which supports an arbitrary number of enclaves, TrustZone sup-
ports a single trusted/isolated execution environment (i.e., the secure world). Ko-
modo [58] provably extends TrustZone to support attested isolated execution envi-
ronments similar to Intel SGX enclaves (though physical memory snooping remains
out of scope.) While SGX is implemented entirely in hardware, Komodo instead
uses a formally verified software implementation that runs on top of ARM Trust-
Zone. Cho et al. [59] explore a hybrid approach to supporting isolated execution
environments with both a hypervisor and ARM TrustZone. During the lifetime of
a secure application, the hypervisor is active and provides isolation; otherwise, the
hypervisor is disabled (reducing overhead) and TrustZone hardware protections are
used to protect sensitive memory regions. Several commercial products [16,17,19,60]
also implement support for isolated execution of trusted applications (TAs).
2.2 Policy Enforcement
In this section, I discuss prior work that enables policy enforcement. Moti-
vated by the security and privacy problems in mobile devices, recent work envisions
many different solutions including novel permission models [61–67] and sandbox-
ing applications [68–71]. Reference monitors and security kernels [72–79] provide
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fine-grained access-control mechanisms that can contain application misbehavior.
However, all of these solutions assume that the OS itself hasn’t been compromised
by an attacker (or isn’t malicious). In the remainder of this section, I will focus on
approaches that rely on various hardware extensions described in the previous sec-
tion to implement isolated software components that enforce various policies, with
a particular focus on those that pertain I/O devices.
Several prior systems investigate binary (on/off) control policies for I/O pe-
ripheral devices on mobile systems [80–82]. Brasser et al. [80] support restricted
spaces where usage of certain devices is not allowed. A local, isolated policy en-
forcement service running in the secure world on ARM TrustZone grants a remote
policy server RW access to system memory; a trusted vetting server protects against
rogue accesses issued by the policy server. Santos et al. [81,82] allow users to grant
“trust leases” to applications that let the them restrict usage of certain devices until
a terminal condition is met (e.g., after X hours). These systems are closely related
to my own work on SeCloak [1], which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 4. Se-
Cloak does not make any assumptions about the trustworthiness or correctness of
the platform OS, and can reliably secure peripheral devices even when the platform
OS (and the rest of the software) is compromised.
Other systems support different points in the policy space for I/O peripheral
devices beyond on/off control. Ditio [83] employs a combination of a hypervisor and
a kernel in the ARM TrustZone secure world to efficiently audit sensor activities by
recording logs that are later processed by a formally verified auditing tool. Viola [84]
enables custom, per-peripheral notifications whenever the I/O peripheral device is
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being used; for example, blinking the notification LED when the camera is active.
Viola employs formal verification techniques to provide guarantees that the user will
be notified. All of these policies can be implemented on top of AIO, as discussed
in Chapter 5.3, which also supports composing policies at multiple privilege levels
from many (mutually distrusting) principals.
BitVisor [85] is a hypervisor that enforces security on both I/O control and
data accesses, mediating specific accesses to enforce security policy. While BitVisor
does support arbitrary policies, there are several downsides compared to AIO since
BitVisor: 1) does not isolate policies from one another or from the hypervisor itself,
2) only allows application of a single policy per device (restricting composition), and
3) does not enable policies issuing their own I/O accesses (limiting expressiveness).
Cox et al. [86] argue for the utility of running hypervisors beneath the existing
platform software on commodity mobile devices. In particular, this would be bene-
ficial for enabling secure operating systems and supporting various security services.
Both SeCloak and AIO are examples of this vision for a security-focused layer.
2.3 Trusted I/O
In this section, I discuss prior work that supports secure interactions with
I/O devices, which falls into one of the two following categories. First, I describe
prior work that provides generic mechanisms for establishing trusted I/O channels
to arbitrary devices. Second, I present prior work that enables secure interactions
with specific devices, such as the display or biometric sensors.
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2.3.1 Generic Mechanisms
Zhou et al. [32] present a hypervisor-based design for enabling trusted I/O
channels for commodity x86 processors by leveraging virtualization extensions. The
hypervisor hosts both the untrusted OS as well as the trusted program endpoints
(PEs) in separate VMs. The PEs contain all of the necessary application logic and
lower-level device drivers to interact with the device. In follow-up work [33], Zhou et
al. address bloating of the trusted-computing base (TCB) as a result of needing to
include drivers within the PEs. They introduce a trusted “wimpy” kernel beneath
the application PEs, which outsources (and subsequently verifies) certain parts of the
I/O stack to the untrusted commodity OS. In this work, they focused specifically on
the USB subsystem, where the bus enumeration and power management functions
are outsourced to the commodity OS.
DriverGuard [34] protects I/O data flows by using a hypervisor to enforce that
only privileged code blocks (PCBs) can operate on the raw, unencrypted I/O data.
SGXIO [35] posits a system in which a hypervisor hosts the untrusted OS (running
in a VM) as well as the trusted I/O drivers (running in SGX enclaves). Applications
run their trusted components inside an enclave and establish trusted paths to the
necessary I/O drivers. Lacuna [87] ensures that I/O flows can be securely erased
from memory once they terminate, by relying on virtualization, encryption, and
direct NIC access.
As compared to these prior approaches, AIO focuses on providing support for
building trusted paths via composable modules, while enabling sharing of devices
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(if desired) amongst multiple non-secure and secure applications that is enforced by
the credential model and first-class support for policies. AIO adopts a similar view
on TCB reduction to the work by Zhou et al. [33] (i.e., re-using untrusted code),
but allows for more flexibility beyond the singular “outsource and verify” approach;
for example, AIO policies can be used to enforce a behavior specification over the
accesses made by the untrusted code.
2.3.2 Specific Devices
Much prior work [20–31] focuses on enabling specific trusted paths such as
a secure virtual keyboard, confidential display, and trusted sensors. TrustUI [20]
enables trusted paths without trusting device drivers by splitting drivers into an
untrusted backend and trusted frontend that runs within the secure kernel. TrustUI
uses ad-hoc techniques, such as randomizing keys on the on-screen keyboard after
every touch, for ensuring that the information available to the non-secure kernel
does not leak device data. ShrodinText [21] is a system for displaying text while
preserving its confidentiality from the untrusted OS. ShrodinText establishes a se-
cure path between a remote (trusted) server and the local framebuffer/display for
this purpose, relying on TrustZone and a hypervisor (for MMU and IOMMUs) to se-
cure parts of the rendering stack. Liu et al. [22] uses trusted device and bus drivers,
implemented in TrustZone and hypervisors, to attest and encrypt sensor readings.
Finally, many of the commercial TEE products [16, 17, 19] implement support for
specific trusted I/O channels, such as a secure PIN input and fingerprint-based
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biometric authentication.
AIO can support the same functionality as these systems within a more gen-
eral architecture, while simultaneously providing first-class support for user policies.
This general architecture also supports composing pieces of functionality and poli-
cies from multiple (mutually distrusting) principals, in contrast to the traditional
model in which there is a single, all-trusted security principal that is responsible for
providing the secure functionality (e.g., trusted I/O channels and device drivers).
2.4 OS Architectures
Many widespread OSs, such as Linux and Windows, exhibit a monolithic struc-
ture, whereby most services (e.g., device drivers, network stack) are implemented
within the OS kernel itself. While there are many benefits such as functionality and
performance, there are also drawbacks to such an architecture. One such drawback
is a lack of isolation between services within the kernel. This is especially important
with respect to device drivers, as they are a significant source for bugs in OS ker-
nels [88, 89]. To account for for this, there has been a shift towards implementing
drivers in userspace [90,91] for better fault isolation. Another drawback is that, due
to the structure of the kernel, the size of the TCB is extremely large and thus very
susceptible to vulnerabilities [92]. There has been work on leveraging hardware vir-
tualization and security extensions to support isolation for applications that run on
an untrusted host OS [39–41,43]. Additionally, extending the kernel with new func-
tionality is challenging, because the code that implements the functionality must
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run in the same protection domain as the kernel itself; SPIN [93], VINO [94], and
eBPF [95, 96] support safe extensibility. AIO leverages eBPF for safe extensibility
by allowing policies to be executed within AIO’s protection domain for improved
performance.
In part motivated by attacks against monolithic OSs [92], microkernel archi-
tectures aim to minimize the functionality within the kernel itself and instead push
as much of this functionality into userspace services as possible [97]. Many modern
microkernels exist, such as seL4 [98], which has formally verified correctness and
security properties, and Zircon [99], which is used as the kernel within Google’s
Fuchsia OS [100]. In contrast to monolithic kernels, microkernels offer far more
isolation and a significant reduction in the size of the TCB. While necessary, these
properties are not sufficient alone. Our design and implementation of AIO on ARM
TrustZone is similar to that of a microkernel: AIO isolates each module in userspace
(like services), mediates communication between modules, and exercises access con-
trol over system resources. AIO provides a way to extend (or replace) functionality
provided by services, and apply and enforce policies over communication between
different modules (services); AIO uses capabilities to safely compose these software
components that may be associated with many mutually distrusting principals. Ad-
ditionally, AIO enables reasoning about the components that make up the software
stack between the underlying hardware devices and a (remote) application endpoint
via attestations over AIO, modules, and the state of paths. Note that it is possible
to implement AIO as a (privileged) service on top of a trusted microkernel such as
seL4 [98].
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Scout [101] introduces paths as a first-class abstraction within the OS. A path
in Scout consists of a sequence of routers, each implementing some functionality
behind a well-defined interface; the routing decisions may either be static at compile
time or dynamic at runtime (e.g., demultiplexing ports for UDP/TCP packets).
Escort [102] extends Scout to provide for various security features, such as isolation
between (parts of) paths and supporting static filters for the interactions between
routers. Unlike Scout/Escort, which require the routing graph to be defined at build
time, AIO allows both modules and policies to be installed and removed at runtime.
As part of AIO, we recognize the need to support multiple mutually distrusting
principals that may contribute software components that make up the paths; AIO
leverages a credential scheme, backed by a trusted specification of the hardware, to
safely compose the modules into paths (and apply policies along the path). Finally,
AIO provides stronger guarantees by isolating itself (along with all modules and
policies) from the untrusted platform software, and allows for several different ways
to decompose trust that allows for trade-offs between TCB size and performance.
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Chapter 3: Enforcement Layer
In this chapter, I motiviate the need for an isolated enforcement layer by
revisiting the goals and examining different potential solutions (and their issues).
Next, I describe the trust and threat model that I assume in this work. Finally, I
discuss the (trusted) hardware specification that all enforcement layers require to
securely mediate access to hardware devices.
3.1 Motivation
As discussed in the thesis statement, we consider two primary goals for the
enforcement layer. First, the enforcement layer should reliably enforce expressive
policies that are applied by users (and other stakeholders) to the collection, process-
ing, and sharing of I/O data. We address this problem at the level of I/O data since
hardware I/O devices always serve as either the sources and/or sinks for sensitive
data, whether collected via input sensors (e.g., audio, location) or sent to output
devices (e.g., display, network). Second, the enforcement layer should expose the
state of the device in a simple, unambiguous manner. This state should enable
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Figure 3.1: Different ways to place the enforcement component within the existing
system architecture.
plication endpoints. In particular, reasoning about the assurances that this software
stack provides over the data (e.g., confidentiality, integrity) and the precise set of
components that make up this software stack.
There are several possible ways to augment existing systems with support
for such an enforcement layer, as shown in Figure 3.1. First, we could consider
placing the enforcement layer within the platform software itself (e.g., the platform
OS). This would allow the enforcement layer to have high visibility into the rest
of the system, as the platform software sits directly between the applications and
the underlying hardware. However, as discussed earlier, the platform software has
a large attack surface and has continually proven to be vulnerable to attacks; it is
very hard to completely secure such a large, complex software base.
Alternatively, we could consider placing the enforcement layer within the hard-
ware itself. This would limit the visibility of the enforcement layer, but puts it in
the best possible position to mediate software accesses to hardware devices. Un-
fortunately, the inflexibility of the hardware layer presents a significant challenge.
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Technologies, such as Intel SGX [43], that implement most of the functionality within
the hardware have run into these issues as a result of new attacks and changing fea-
ture requirements. Ideally, the hardware should provide simple, generic primitives
that enable various implementations and abstractions in the software layer.
Instead, we could consider placing the enforcement layer within a new, iso-
lated layer of software that sits between the platform software and the underlying
hardware. While the enforcement layer suffers the same issue of limited visibility
as in the hardware approach, we gain increased flexibility by defining it within a
software layer. The enforcement layer will rely on more minimal hardware support
in the form of enabling mechanisms that allow the enforcement layer to: 1) isolate
itself from other (potentially compromised) software on the device, and 2) mediate
interactions between software and the hardware resources. By operating as an inde-
pendent software layer, the enforcement layer avoids fate-sharing with the platform
software as a result of attacks; however, it is important to minimize the TCB of the
enforcement layer to limit the attack surface of this critical component itself.
As discussed in Section 2.1, these mechanisms may be supported by (a mix
of) virtualization extensions and security extensions. For example, the facilities pro-
vided by TrustZone are sufficient for the isolation and mediation properties required
to implement such an enforcement layer. Isolation can be achieved by running the
enforcement layer in the secure world, with the platform software and applications
running in the non-secure world. Mediation can be achieved by configuring the
hardware protections and trapping access faults within the enforcement layer in the
secure world.
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3.2 Trust and Threat Model
There are many principals that make up the ecosystem for smart devices:
device manufacturer, platform provider, user, and various application principals. A
device manufacturer is responsible for building and provisioning the hardware device;
Samsung is an example of a device manufacturer. A platform provider supplies
the platform software, which includes the OS and privileged system frameworks
and services; Google and Samsung are both examples of platform providers for the
Android/Linux software platform. A user is an owner of a device; we entrust the
user with full privileges over their device, which they can (temporarily) delegate
to other principals. An application principal provides applications that the user
installs and executes on their device; banks and health authorities are examples of
application principals. These principals may be mutually distrusting.
All principals trust in the correctness and security of the enforcement layer. All
principals also trust the underlying hardware devices, which includes all resources
within the system-on-chip (SoC) as well as peripheral devices; all static firmware
and microcode executed by the devices are included in this trusted scope as well.
All principals trust that the device manufacturer provides a correct and complete
specification of the hardware that they provisioned. I discuss these hardware speci-
fications in more detail later in this chapter (see Section 3.3). Finally, all principals
trust that the boot ROM provisioned by the device manufacturer is secure and
correct.
The enforcement layer does not place any trust in the software from the plat-
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form provider, including the OS kernel, device drivers, kernel modules, and any
privileged system frameworks and services. Additionally, the enforcement layer does
not trust the applications that run on top of the platform software base. All of this
software may be faulty, malicious, or compromised by an attacker.
I will later refine this threat model within the precise context of both SeCloak
and AIO enforcement layers in their respective chapters.
3.3 Hardware Specification
The enforcement layer must understand the configuration of the hardware in
order to mediate software accesses to devices. We assume the enforcement layer
has access to a trusted hardware specification that describes: 1) the complete set
of hardware resources on the device, and 2) how the hardware resources are inter-
connected. It is important that the specification provides a complete and accurate
description of the hardware, since otherwise there may be other peripherals in the
system that can violate any and all security properties (as the enforcement layer
will not be aware of their existence).
While this specification may be written in a variety of different ways, we rely
on the device tree (DT) [103] format to serve as the basis for the specification. The
DT format is widely used to specify the hardware resources for embedded systems.
In Figure 3.2, we present an excerpt from the DT for the Nitrogen6Q development
board that contains an i.MX6 (SoC). This excerpt from the DT focuses on two







  intc {
    reg = <0x00A01000 0x1000>, <0x00A00100 0x100>;
  };
  soc {
    interrupt-parent = <&intc>;
    aips1 {
      gpio1 {
        compatible = “fsl,imx6q-gpio”;
        reg = <0x0209C000 0x4000>;
        interrupts = <0 66 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
    };};
    aips2 {
      reg = <0x02100000 0x100000>;
      uart5 {
        compatible = “fsl,imx6q-uart”;
        reg = <0x021F4000 0x4000>;
        interrupts = <0 30 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
        gps {
          compatible = “GP-20U7”;
      };};
      i2c3 {
        compatible = "fsl,imx6q-i2c";
        reg = <0x021a8000 0x4000>;
        interrupts = <0 38 IRQ_HIGH>;
        ft5x06_ts {
          compatible = "ft5x06-ts";
          reg = <0x38>;
          interrupts-extended = <&gpio1 9 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;












Figure 3.2: Visualization of the device tree with a corresponding excerpt from the
device tree file for the Boundary Devices Nitrogen6Q board with an i.MX6 SoC.
device (ft5x06 ts).
The DT is specified hierarchically, which follows from the layout of the hard-
ware: each platform or peripheral device (leaf node) connects to the CPU through
one or more bus devices (inner nodes). The root node (/) in the hierarchy corre-
sponds to the system bus. Each device node in the DT is assigned a name which,
along with the full path, may be used to reference the device (e.g., “/soc/aips2/uart5/gps”
for the GPS receiver). Each device node contains a set of key-value properties that
describe device-specific information. Some of these properties specify resource de-
pendencies of the device on other devices in the system; the reg property specifies
how the device may be addressed through its parent device, and interrupts specifies
the interrupt lines that the device uses to communicate with the software driver
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running on the CPU. For example, the GPS receiver device “/soc/aips2/uart5/gps”
depends on the UART bus it is attached to, while the UART controller depends on
a 16kB addressable region of the AIPS peripheral bus (which connects to the system
bus) and IRQ 30 of the interrupt controller. Hardware devices are bound to specific
device driver implementations via the compatible property, which contains a list of
string names that the software can use to match against available device drivers.
In addition to the information typically contained in the DT, the enforcement
layer requires additional properties for the DT to serve as the trusted hardware
specification. The aio-deps property contains the names of all non-standard prop-
erties that capture any dependencies on other devices; the set of standard properties
includes interrupts , interrupts-extended , and clocks . The aio-prot property asso-
ciates the device with a particular hardware protection domain; on the i.MX6 SoC,
this would reference the CSU device with a resource specifier that contains the CSL
register index that holds the access control configuration for the device. The aio-
class property for each peripheral device to associate it with one or more high-level
classes of devices (e.g., “Touchscreen”, “Network”).
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Chapter 4: SeCloak: On/Off Control for
Peripheral Devices
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present my work on SeCloak. SeCloak enables users to reli-
ably express on/off control over I/O peripherals on their device, such as radios (e.g.,
WiFi, Bluetooth) and sensors (e.g., GPS, microphone). For example, journalists in-
terviewing confidential sources may want to use the microphone but reliably turn off
the radios and GPS, and users may want to make sure the camera and microphone
are disabled during private meetings. This guarantee holds even in the presence
of malicious applications or compromise of the platform software, including the OS
itself.
We1 provide a simple abstraction to users of secure virtual switches that they
can use to control the various peripherals on their device. We designed SeCloak
to implement this abstraction, which acts as an independent, platform-agnostic en-
forcement layer beneath the existing platform and applications. In order to minimize
1This work involved collaborations with Rijurehkha Sen, Peter Druschel, and Bobby Bhat-
tacharjee.
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the trusted code base, we divided the design of SeCloak into two parts: an untrusted
settings application and a trusted enforcement layer (the SeKernel). The user inter-
acts with an untrusted settings application, which presents a traditional interface
to the user. The application communicates the desired policy to the enforcement
layer, which is responsible for requesting explicit user confirmation before applying
and enforcing the settings based on a trusted specification of the hardware.
We implemented SeCloak by building on top of the ARM TrustZone hard-
ware security extensions. The SeKernel runs as the secure world OS, which controls
all memory and peripheral accesses of the non-secure world; the existing system
software runs in the non-secure world. While TrustZone provides support for con-
figuring access control to peripherals, there are several issues that make things more
challenging in practice to satisfy the goals of SeCloak. First, it is common that the
hardware provides access control settings at a granularity that is too coarse grained
compared to the granularity at which the user wants to disable devices (i.e., not for
individual peripheral devices). Either multiple peripheral devices may be grouped
into a single protection domain, or they may share a common multiplexed bus which
is the level that such access control is applied and enforced. Second, we need to be
able to handle non-secure accesses to protected devices in such a way that maintains
usability and stability of the system.
The primary contribution of this work is the design and implementation of
an end-to-end system that satisfies all of our stated goals. The entire SeKernel,
including secure device initialization, setting device state per user preference, user
interaction for confirmation, and instruction emulation, is only 15k lines of code. (In
30
comparison, the Linux kernel is roughly 13m lines of code.) We believe our SeKernel
TCB size satisfies our goal of having a minimal TCB, although more work could be
done to reduce it further in practice (e.g., avoiding use of virtual memory). Finally,
SeCloak requires 1 source line to be changed in the Linux kernel (the change can
be applied directly to the kernel binary if the source is not available), introduces a
new kernel module (for calls into the SeKernel), and no change whatsoever to other
software layers (e.g., Android, applications).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. I present an overview of the
design of SeCloak and how to map such a design onto ARM TrustZone in Section 4.3.
I describe the design and implementation of the SeKernel in Section 4.4 and the non-
secure software components in Section 4.5. I present the evaluation of the prototype
implementation in Section 4.6, and finally conclude in Section 4.7.
4.2 Closely-Related Work
While I introduced related work in Chapter 2, I will take a deeper look at the
prior work that is closely-related to SeCloak next.
Brasser et al. [80] enable on/off control of peripheral devices that are in re-
stricted spaces (e.g., where the use of the camera is not allowed). The system relies
on a local, TrustZone-isolated policy enforcement service that grants a remote policy
server read/write access to system memory. To protect against rogue accesses, the
user relies on a separate vetting server that determines whether to allow or deny
each of the policy server’s memory access requests. The policy server uses this re-
31
mote memory access capability to query the state of the platform OS and modify
the OS’s device configuration according to the desired policy. The policy server
must be able to handle any platform OS version, configuration, and state, which
increases its TCB and requisite maintenance over time. Also, the policy server can-
not tolerate any vulnerability in the platform OS that is not known to the policy
server (e.g., zero-day exploits), and must periodically re-check the state to ensure
continued compliance. Like this work, SeCloak provides reliable on/off control of
peripheral devices; however, it does so under a stronger threat model that includes
a compromised platform OS. Additionally, SeCloak has a smaller TCB as it does
not depend on any details of the platform OS in order to meet the requisite security
properties.
Santos et al. [81,82] present “trust leases”, which allow applications to request
(with user approval) leases to place the device in a restricted mode until some
terminal condition is met (e.g., after 4 hours). The trust lease model could be
used to implement a settings application that allows the users on/off control over
peripheral I/O devices. Their threat model assumes that the platform OS is trusted
and correct; their prototype implementation lives inside the Android framework
and Linux kernel. In contrast, SeCloak has a stronger threat model that includes a
malicious platform OS, and operates as a separate, minimal secure kernel that runs
alongside the existing platform OS.
PROTC [104] is a system for safeguarding flight control systems on drones from
non-essential but malicious software. PROTC runs applications in the TrustZone




























Figure 4.1: Overview of the SeCloak architecture mapped to an implementation on
ARM TrustZone.
PROTC’s secure kernel communicates with ground control using an encrypted chan-
nel. Compared to SeCloak, PROTC is designed for a different application domain,
and does not allow for dynamic modification of protected peripherals. Untrusted
applications are always isolated, and the secure kernel contains all of the protected
device drivers.
Viola [84] enables custom, per-peripheral notifications whenever the I/O pe-
ripheral device is being used; for example, blinking the notification LED when the
camera is active. Viola employs formal verification techniques to provide guaran-
tees that the user will be notified. SeCloak and Viola are complementary: the user
could use SeCloak to disable devices and rely on Viola to notify them when specific
enabled devices are in use.
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4.3 Design Overview
Figure 4.1 illustrates the SeCloak architecture that leverages underlying mech-
anisms provided by ARM TrustZone. In our design, Android/Linux and all appli-
cations run in the non-secure world, while our SeKernel enforcement layer runs in
the secure world as both the monitor and the OS. The SeKernel is responsible for
configuring the hardware protection mechanisms to isolate itself from other software
on the system and to enforce the user’s control policy settings.
As discussed in Section 4.2, many prior approaches have ported (parts of)
device drivers into a secure kernel to provide robust access to peripherals, and for
limiting the access given to the non-secure kernel. However, none of these systems
satisfy the goals of SeCloak. Our work departs from these systems in two major
ways: we do not modify the non-secure kernel— everything, including device drivers
and interfaces, remain completely unchanged. Additionally, our secure kernel TCB
is extremely small (see Section 4.6.1); we do not require a significant set of device
drivers or complex mechanisms within the SeKernel to enable the functionality. In
fact, the bulk of the functionality provided by the SeKernel relies on: 1) under-
standing the hardware configuration from a trusted hardware specification, and 2)
trapping and emulating loads/stores to enable selective access to peripherals.
4.3.1 SeCloak Workflow
Figure 4.2 shows the SeCloak workflow. Users interact with a regular Android
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Figure 4.2: Overview of the SeCloak workflow. The first panel (leftmost) shows a
screenshot of the non-secure Android app. The second panel shows the steps taken
after the user pushes the button to apply the settings. The third panel shows a
photograph of the secure SeCloak app, which (re-)displays the settings to the user
and waits for user confirmation. (Screenshots are not possible in secure mode.)
The fourth panel shows the steps taken if the user confirms the settings, such as
disabling/enabling devices and returning control back to the non-secure world (and
app).
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peripherals. This app is similar to the “Settings” apps that are already available on
smartphones and tablets.
An implicit assumption is that users understand which peripherals should be
turned off (or on) under different circumstances. Towards this end, the SeCloak
app helps users by providing pre-defined operating modes (e.g. Airplane mode or
Stealth mode) and associated settings for the appropriate groups of peripherals. As
we shall see next, SeCloak ensures that for any mode or sets of individual devices
that the user chooses in this step, the user receives an unambiguous confirmation of
their state.
Once the user chooses “Set Preferences?”, the app uses a Linux device driver
to invoke a cross-kernel call, called a SMC call in TrustZone (second panel from left in
Figure 4.2). The argument to this call encodes the user’s preferences. The SeKernel
receives these preferences as part of the SMC call handler. Note that malicious
software (the app, system services, the non-secure kernel) could have changed the
preferences prior to the SMC call!
User preferences, possibly modified, are received within the SeKernel as part
of the SMC call. At this point, the SeKernel takes exclusive access of the framebuffer
and hardware buttons. The SeKernel parses the preferences, and recreates an image
that exactly corresponds to the settings passed via the SMC call, and copies this
images to the framebuffer. If the preferences had been modified, the image on the
framebuffer would not correspond to the settings chosen by the user, and the user
would notice a setting that does not correspond to their choice. The user is thus
notified of malicious software on their device.
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The SeKernel changes the “Set Preferences?” button to one that allows the
user to confirm the settings by pressing a hard button (the “Home” button), or to
go back (using the Back key) to the app and continue changing settings. We show
a photograph of this screen (with a red secure confirm button) in the third panel of
Figure 4.2.
A malicious app could display the preferences screen and then spoof the con-
firmation screen. It is imperative that during the confirmation phase, the user is
unambiguously notified that she is interacting with the SeKernel. Thus, during
this phase, the SeKernel lights a protected LED which ensures the user that she
is interacting with the SeKernel. This LED is never accessible to the non-secure
kernel.
Assuming the settings were as the user intended, she may confirm the settings
by pressing the “Home” button. The SeKernel disables (or enables) various IO
devices and peripherals as instructed (rightmost panel in Figure 4.2).
4.4 SeCloak Secure Kernel
We describe SeCloak’s secure kernel, called the SeKernel, in this section. A
signed device tree describes available hardware and protections to the SeKernel.
Prior to describing the kernel itself, we discuss how it is securely booted (next), and
the device tree.
Modern devices are equipped with secure, tamper-proof, non-volatile storage,
into which device manufacturers embed (hashes of) public keys. The devices contain
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a one-time programmable Boot ROM that has access to these keys, which are “fused”
onto the hardware.
In bootstrapping SeCloak, we assume that a trusted principal (either the hard-
ware manufacturer or the user) has performed the following steps:
• Generated a trusted key, and stored the key onto the tamper-proof non-volatile
storage. For convenience, modern devices often allow multiple such keys to
be “fused” onto the hardware; once installed, these cannot be removed or
modified by software.
• Program the boot ROM to load a signed bootloader image. The boot ROM
verifies the signature against the fused key(s) and then executes the bootloader
if successful.
• The bootloader (U-Boot [105] in our case) contains a set of public keys which it
uses to verify signatures on all loaded images. The bootloader will locate and
load a signed SeKernel image and signed device tree blob (explained next). Af-
ter verifying the signatures, the bootloader will execute the SeKernel. Modern
bootloaders already support such verified booting.
4.4.1 Device Tree
The SeKernel needs to learn the complete set of available peripheral devices
as well as the mapping between hardware protection mechanisms and devices. We
use the device tree (DT), as described in Section 3.3, along with several additional
properties such that it can serve as a trusted specification of the hardware for the
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SeKernel. First, we add a “class” property that maps low-level components (such as
interrupts and pins) to user-understandable names, such as “microphone”, “WiFi”,
etc. These class strings correspond to individual devices that can be controlled via
SeCloak. Second, we add a “protect” property that identifies hardware protection
bits that must be set to protect the device. On our prototype, these map devices to
their associated CSU registers.
4.4.2 SeCloak Kernel
Upon boot, the SeKernel initializes hardware defaults prior to launching the
non-secure kernel. Specific steps include setting control and security registers to ap-
propriate defaults, and setting memory protections such that the non-secure kernel
cannot overwrite the SeKernel’s state.
The SeKernel initializes its internal data structures by initializing the system
MMU with virtual memory page table mappings for various regions, including re-
gions for non-secure RAM, SeKernel heap, and for MMIO devices. The SeKernel
also starts the non-boot CPUs, and initializes per-core threads and their contexts.
Faults and calls from the non-secure kernel transition the CPU into a monitor mode,
and the SeKernel initializes the secure monitor with its stack pointer and call vector.
Finally, the SeKernel opens and parses the device tree.
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4.4.2.1 SeKernel Device Drivers
The SeKernel itself contains minimal drivers for three devices: GIC (generic
interrupt controller), GPIO controller, and the framebuffer. The GIC driver isolates
interrupts that can be received by the non-secure kernel, the GPIO controller allows
the SeKernel to directly interact with hardware buttons, and the framebuffer driver
allows the SeKernel to render the confirmation screen. Together, they enable the
secure part of SeCloak. We explain these drivers next.
GIC Driver The Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC) chip handles the distribution
of interrupts to CPU cores and enables isolated control and handling of non-secure
and secure interrupts. The SeKernel GIC driver supports functions to (1) enable
or disable specific interrupts, (2) set CPU mask and interrupt priority, (3) assign
interrupts to security groups, and (4) registering interrupt handlers. These functions
allow isolating interrupts associated with specific devices to be either completely
disabled or to be delivered to the SeKernel. The SeKernel can receive hardware
interrupts and optionally re-deliver them to the non-secure kernel; for example, this
functionality is used by the GPIO and GPIO keys drivers that we describe next.
GPIO Driver The general-purpose input-output (GPIO) controller supports in-
put and output operations on individual hardware pins. In addition, the GPIO
controller can also act as an interrupt controller on a per-pin basis. When an in-
terrupt condition is triggered for a pin, the GPIO controller triggers a (chained)
interrupt which is handled by the GIC.
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The SeKernel GPIO driver supports acquiring/releasing pins for exclusive
SeKernel use, registering an interrupt handler for a given pin, and reading (or writ-
ing) values from (or to) a pin. The GPIO driver relies on the GIC driver to register
its own interrupt handler, which (when invoked) will read the GPIO device state in
order to determine which pins raised the interrupt, and then invoke handlers cor-
responding to these pins. The driver protects and emulates accesses to the GPIO
controllers in order to allow the non-secure world to continue to use any non-acquired
pins while preventing it from inferring any information about the acquired (secured)
pins.
Building on the GPIO driver, the GPIO keys driver supports hardware but-
tons/keys connected to GPIO pins (e.g., power and volume buttons). The GPIO
keys handler translates hardware button presses into a key code that is specified
in the device tree (e.g., KEY BACK) and passes it on to any SeKernel listeners. The
listeners can choose to consume the key press or allow it to be passed back to the
non-secure world. We use the GPIO keys driver to register listeners for a secure
shutdown sequence (see Section 4.5.2), and also for the cloak application to wait for
the user to confirm or deny the displayed settings.
Framebuffer Driver The SeKernel framebuffer driver uses the image processing
unit (IPU) device to display images. When the SeKernel application acquires the
framebuffer, the driver allocates a single buffer in the secure region of memory and
sets the buffer format (RGB24) in the IPU. Additionally, the driver protects access
to the IPU and emulates accesses in order to prevent the non-secure world from
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overwriting the settings (see Section 4.4.6.1 for emulation policy details). When the
SeKernel application releases the framebuffer, the driver restores the previous set-
tings of the non-secure world and unprotects the IPU. Additionally, the framebuffer
driver provides helper functions for clearing the buffer with a single color and for
blitting images onto the display at specified locations. We rely on the framebuffer
driver for (re-)displaying the settings in the SeCloak app. The images displayed by
the SeKernel framebuffer driver cannot be modified by the non-secure kernel.
4.4.3 SMC Handlers
The SeKernel supports two SMC calls, CLOAK SET and CLOAK GET, from
the non-secure kernel to enable SeCloak.
The non-secure kernel invokes the CLOAK SET call with a bitvector as the
argument. Individual bits in the bitvector correspond to the settings for differ-
ent device classes. The bitvector contains “special” bits that encode modes (e.g.,
Airplane, Movie, Stealth), and groups (e.g., Networking) as displayed by the app.
The CLOAK SET handler executes the following steps:
• It starts by acquiring the framebuffer and GPIO keypad (via GPIO). As de-
scribed in Section 4.4.2.1, acquiring devices applies necessary hardware pro-
tection settings, emulation policy, and initial settings for the secure use of the
device.
• The CLOAK SET handler parses the bitvector and checks to see if it is valid;
if so, it uses framebuffer driver routines to blit corresponding images to the
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screen in order to (re-)display the settings to the user.
• Next, the notification LED, which is persistently acquired for exclusive use by
the SeKernel, is turned on by the handler (via GPIO) to notify the user that
the SeKernel is in control.
• The CLOAK SET handler then waits for the user to confirm (via the ‘Home’
button) or deny (via the ‘Back’ button) the settings via its registered GPIO
keypad listener. If the user confirms the settings, the handler will issue calls to
enable or disable each device class; otherwise, if the user denies the settings,
the handler does not take any action.
• Finally, the handler releases the acquired devices (which resets per-device state
as necessary, e.g., framebuffer formatting and addresses) and returns.
In order to disable (or re-enable) a device class, the CLOAK SET handler
first identifies all devices that belong to the given class (as described in the device
tree). For each of those devices, the handler locates any “protect” properties, which
identify the hardware protection that must be set to isolate the device. In some
cases, the device itself may not have hardware protection, but the bus it is located
on may. Thus, the code must search for possible hardware isolation not just at the
device node, but recursively up the device tree as well. In this way, the SeKernel
applies the hardware isolation for each device as described in the device tree.
The non-secure kernel can use the CLOAK GET call to receive a bitvector that
encodes the current protection state of device classes (and which mode is active or
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which groups are enabled or disabled). Upon launch, the non-secure Android app
uses this call to render an initial setting.
4.4.4 Non-Secure and Secure Device Sharing
We rely on the ability to share devices between the non-secure and secure
worlds, such as for providing a secure shutdown sequence via the GPIO keypad
(e.g., power and volume buttons) while still allowing the non-secure world to handle
button presses. Two underlying mechanisms enable such sharing: 1) redelivering
interrupts to the non-secure world, and 2) emulation policy to control the non-secure
view of the device. While explaining the mechanisms, we will focus on the example
of the GPIO controller. The GPIO controller uses a GIC interrupt in order to signal
that the interrupt condition is met for one (or more) pins.
In order to share interrupts with the non-secure world, we modify the device
tree such that the SeKernel operates on the actual hardware interrupt line of the
device that is connected to the GIC, while the non-secure kernel operates on a
(previously unused) interrupt line. When the SeKernel receives an interrupt that
should be shared, it sets the corresponding non-secure world interrupt line pending
via the GIC.
As part of handling the GPIO interrupt, the driver must acknowledge the
interrupt using the Interrupt Status Register (ISR). The ISR contains a bit for each
pin that is 1 if an interrupt condition is met; writes to the ISR acknowledge the
interrupt and reset the corresponding bit to 0. The SeKernel specifies an emulation
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policy on the region of memory associated with the GPIO device, such that it can
control the reads and writes to the various device registers (including the ISR). When
the SeKernel shares an interrupt with the non-secure kernel, it keeps track of this in
a bitmask. Later, when the non-secure kernel reads from the ISR after receiving an
interrupt, the SeKernel policy returns the value of the ISR OR’d with the sharing
bitmask (which is needed to handle edge-triggered interrupts). After handling the
GPIO interrupt (e.g., invoking the GPIO keypad handler), the non-secure kernel
writes a 1 to the pin to acknowledge and clear the interrupt; the SeKernel applies
policy to this write by clearing the bit in the sharing bitmask. Additionally, this
policy extends to support SeKernel-only pins by maintaining a secure mask which
is used to modify the writes and reads made by the non-secure kernel (e.g., masking
the pins in the ISR corresponding to SeKernel-only pins).
4.4.5 DMA
Devices that are DMA masters can issue memory accesses on the system bus.
For example, the Image Processing Unit (IPU) will perform periodic DMA transfers
to read from framebuffers (whose addresses are specified in the IPU’s registers).
Each DMA master has permissions assigned for its bus accesses (i.e., non-secure or
secure), which (on our platform) are configured in the CSU registers. In order to
prevent the DMA masters from reading (or even modifying) the SeKernel memory,
we must configure their accesses as non-secure. However, this presents a problem
for the IPU device: since we need to present a secure framebuffer to the screen, it
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must be able to perform DMA accesses to secure memory regions. To address this,
we use the TZASC to configure the region that contains the framebuffer as non-
secure read and secure read/write. While this lets the non-secure kernel inspect the
secure framebuffer, we do not require confidentiality of this framebuffer for any of
our security goals (only the integrity of its contents).
4.4.6 Instruction Faults and Emulation
The SeKernel configures TrustZone such that accesses by the non-secure kernel
to memory regions that belong to protected devices cause a fault. This fault is
trapped by the monitor mode handler of the SeKernel. We need these traps to be
able to selectively allow or deny non-secure kernel accesses to devices.
For a rudimentary SeCloak app, it is sufficient to simply configure TrustZone
protections, and ignore these faults. However, such a solution is unworkable if we
want the device to remain usable, as per our original goals, when specific peripherals
are protected. In general, the SeKernel has to trap the faulting instructions, and
selectively emulate them based on hardware state as we describe in this section.
There are two main reasons to intercept non-secure accesses to protected re-
sources and emulate these accesses in the secure world. First, there can be a mis-
match between the granularity of hardware protection and that of individual devices
that are being protected. For instance, on the i.MX 6 [106], the Central Security
Unit (CSU) contains Config Security Level (CSL) registers that restrict access to
peripheral devices according to whether the accesses are made by the non-secure or
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secure world. These CSL registers group multiple devices into a single register (e.g.,
GPIO1 & GPIO2 or PWM1 through PWM4). If we want to disable a single (or subset of)
devices, we must allow accesses to all others that are protected by the CSL group.
Dependencies in the device tree can also cause mismatches in hardware–software
protection granularity. For example, the ft5x06 ts touchscreen uses a GPIO pin to
signal an interrupt to the processor when the user is touching the screen; in order to
secure the touchscreen, we must also secure the individual GPIO pin, but not all the
64 pins that are protected by the corresponding CSL register. Additionally, there
may be a single bus device with hardware protection capability that multiplexes
communication to multiple slave devices. For instance, an I2C bus may serve both
the touchscreen and camera devices; however, if the user disables the camera device,
the touchscreen should still be usable.
Second, we can use emulation for efficiently acquiring devices for (temporary)
exclusive use by secure applications, as well as to share devices between the secure
and non-secure worlds. This can reduce the trusted codebase in the SeKernel, e.g.,
by allowing non-secure kernel writes to the device for non-critical accesses. We use
this technique to reduce the driver code size for the framebuffer driver.
4.4.6.1 Instruction Emulation: Detail
Each access to a device ultimately performs a memory-mapped Input/Output
(MMIO) read or write operation to a region of memory associated with the device.
(The mapping of memory region to device is obtained from the device tree.) When
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hardware protections are enabled for a particular device, MMIO accesses produce
data abort exceptions; these are traditionally handled by the non-secure kernel.
Hardware setup In order to intercept these accesses, SeKernel sets up the Secure
Configuration Register (SCR) in the CPU to specify that all external aborts should
be handled by the monitor. This setting causes data aborts to signal a fault that
transitions the CPU into the secure monitor mode. The faulting address and related
information is available to the monitor fault handler.
In the SeKernel, the secure monitor fault handler invokes a routine that deter-
mines whether to emulate or deny the access and, if emulated, whether to modify
the value being read or written. The SeKernel maintains a data structure that con-
tains regions of memory (physical base address and size) corresponding to different
devices, along with the prevailing policy for each.
The policy associated with each region may choose to deny a read or write. If
a read is allowed, the value that is read can be modified prior to being returned to
the non-secure kernel. If a write is allowed, the value to be written can be modified
prior to the write. The SeKernel code decodes the instruction that cause the original
fault: these instructions are of the form ldr (load register for reads) or str (store
register for writes). By default, the SeKernel emulates the instruction exactly and
returns control back to the non-secure kernel.
NS-kernel Execution Figure 4.3 shows this process. Here a non-secure driver
attempts to read from a device (“Dev 1”) that is disabled by SeCloak. Specifically,
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Figure 4.3: Components and steps involved in intercepting and emulating accesses
made by the non-secure world.
the non-secure kernel code issues a LDR R0, [R1] instruction to load from the ad-
dress pointed to by R1 into R0. The R1 register contains a memory address that
belongs to “Dev 1”.
Upon executing this instruction (1), the CPU issues a read on the system
bus (2). This memory read is intercepted by the hardware firewall (CSU/TZASC)
responsible for protecting “Dev 1”. The firewall checks to see if the access should
be allowed; if not, the firewall returns a bus error to the CPU (which interprets
this as an external data abort). In this case, since “Dev 1” is disabled by SeCloak,
the firewall will deny the read and report a bus error to the CPU (3).2 The CPU
receives this bus error which corresponds to an external data abort. Given the SCR
2The system can be configured to also issue an interrupt to the CPU upon such an error; we
do not use this option in our implementation.
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configuration, the CPU switches to monitor mode and invokes the monitor mode’s
data abort handler (4).
The data abort handler saves (and later restores) the current register set 3
and preserves the location to return to (i.e., the instruction following the faulting
instruction).
Fault Handling At this point, the fault handler has to determine two items: what
was the instruction that caused the fault, and what was the faulting address? By
convention, the Data Fault Address Register (DFAR) contains the virtual address
of the access that caused the fault, and the LR register contains the virtual address
of the instruction that caused the fault. However, these virtual addresses are non-
secure virtual addresses, and the fault handler uses an ARM co-processor routine
to resolve them into physical addresses (“D PA” from the DFAR, and “I PA” from
the LR). The fault handler then passes control to the SeKernel emulation routine
with the saved register context of the non-secure world (called “Ctx”) and these two
addresses as arguments.
The emulation routine (5) begins by translating these physical addresses to
secure-world virtual addresses, and checks to make sure that they are in appropriate
regions: the non-secure RAM for the instruction and a device MMIO region for the
data address. Next, the emulation routine invokes a custom instruction decoder
we have written to decode the instruction and determine the type of instruction
3To be precise, some registers in ARM are “banked” (e.g., the link register LR), in that each
mode has its own copy of the register. The abort handler saves the non-banked registers as well
as the LR corresponding to the mode that caused the abort.
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(whether it is a load or store) and the register involved in the transfer.
Once the instruction and the physical address is decoded, the prevailing policy
(e.g., deny or allow with modifications) is implemented as described above. In this
case, the access is made by a load instruction, so the emulation first checks to see
if the policy allows the read, performs the IO read operation, and finally checks to
see if the policy wants to modify the result (6). If allowed, the final result is stored
in the NS-context structure (that contains the non-secure registers).
In order to handle the case where multiple slave devices share a bus, a bus-
specific policy must be provided. The device tree contains resource information that
specifies how each device will be addressed on the bus; for instance, in the case of
I2C, this corresponds to the 7-bit slave address assigned to each device. The policy
operates over the accesses to the bus’s MMIO region to determine which device is
being accessed, such that it can deny accesses to disabled devices (while allowing
all others).
NS-kernel resume The emulation routine then returns control back to the data
abort handler, which restores the registers for the non-secure world from the NS-
context data structure. Note that for reads, one of these registers may now be
updated as a result. Once the data abort handler terminates, the non-secure kernel




Figure 4.2 shows a screenshot of the SeCloak Android app in the left-most
panel. The current version of the app is simple, allowing users to set ON/OFF
preferences for the devices on our prototype board. Along with individual devices,
the app allows users to choose different operating modes (e.g., Airplane, Stealth)
and also provides the state of groups of peripherals (e.g., all networking devices.)
Once the user presses the “Set Preferences?” button, the app invokes a JNI
call with a bitvector that encodes the user preferences. The JNI module uses a
Linux ioctl call to pass the bitvector to the SeCloak kernel module which, in turn,
issues the SMC call to the SeKernel with the bitvector as an argument.
4.5.1 A modification to the non-secure kernel
Recall that our design goals were not to modify the non-secure kernel or ex-
isting software if at all possible. Unfortunately, without a single byte modification,
as we describe next, we can only provide the security guarantee, but not maintain
system stability.
SeCloak requires that the SeKernel be able to trap individual accesses to pro-
tected devices and selectively emulate these instructions. However, as normally
compiled, a Linux binary on ARM does not raise data aborts that identify the spe-
cific instruction that cause the abort. This is because ARM supports the notion of
precise or imprecise data aborts, which reflects the ability (or inability, respectively)
for the data abort handler to determine the exact instruction that caused the abort
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from the value of the LR register. For precise data aborts, LR points directly (modulo
a fixed offset) to the instruction that caused the abort; however, for imprecise data
aborts, it points to an arbitrary instruction that was executing at that time the
abort was raised.
Whether an instruction raises a precise or imprecise abort depends on the page
table entry (PTE) attributes of the memory that the instruction attempts to access.
Precise data aborts are triggered for ldr and str instructions that access “strongly-
ordered memory”. Strongly ordered memory does not allow accesses to be buffered
by either the processor or bus interconnect [107]. However, by default, memory
regions associated with devices are mapped (e.g., via ioremap in Linux) with the
DEVICE NONSHARED attribute which does not impose strong ordering on the accesses
(unlike the DEVICE SHARED attribute, which does). With this default configuration,
the SeKernel’s data abort handler receives imprecise aborts and, while the handler
can determine the faulting address via the Data Fault Address Register (DFAR), it
cannot accurately determine the address of the instruction that caused the abort
from the link register (LR). As a result, we must modify Linux such that it configures
its device memory mappings to raise precise aborts, using the DEVICE SHARED PTE
attribute. While we do this step directly in the source, it is a simple change that
can, in fact, be applied on the binary kernel image itself.
In our design, the SeKernel assumes that the non-secure kernel is “compliant”
in setting device memory to be strongly-ordered. However, a non-compliant non-
secure kernel can still not access protected devices. It will, however, likely not receive
any useful service from protected device groups due to faulty emulation.
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Kernel Module The SeCloak app requires a kernel module to invoke SMC calls,
and we have added such a module to Linux. (Later versions of the Linux/ARM
kernels already provide a standard SMC interface like our kernel module does, though
even these kernels would require a module to export a userspace interface.) The
kernel module provides a ioctl interface, which is used to communicate the user-
selected bitvector to the non-secure kernel.
Framework Calls Along with the single change to the non-secure kernel, the
SeCloak app also issues Android calls to address application and system stability.
Note that these are not changes to the framework, but instead, extra calls that are
invoked by the SeCloak app.
When the user elects to disable certain devices, the SeKernel configures hard-
ware firewall mechanisms to prevent all accesses to the disabled devices. If the
hardware device is attached to the system bus, then MMIO writes are discarded
and reads return 0; otherwise, if attached to a peripheral bus, then bus access func-
tions will return an error. Ultimately, device drivers are responsible for handling
these errors, which typically involve several retries before abort. These errors will
further propagate to system services (and applications) that are attempting to use
the device; for example, when the camera is disabled and the user attempts to run
the camera app, an error message appears after a few seconds.
Within the kernel, power management (PM) routines in device drivers rely on
the ability to communicate with their devices in order to save relevant state and
direct it to enter a low-power mode. When a device is disabled by the SeKernel,
54
these PM routines will fail and thus keep the device in a high-power active mode.
In adverse cases, the inability to transition individual devices into low power states
can prevent the entire system from being able to transition to a low-power state,
such as suspend-to-RAM. Second, some device drivers may not contain appropriate
error handling to gracefully recover from errors resulting from the denied accesses.
Therefore, the SeCloak app makes use of available system services (e.g., Wifi-
Manager with setWifiEnabled) to disable devices prior to configuring the hardware
firewall mechanisms (and likewise enable devices after removing the hardware fire-
wall restrictions). We use these system services for both the WiFi and Bluetooth
devices. Once again, these untrusted system services need not be used (or trusted)
in order to meet the specified security goals, but improve system availability and
usability.
4.5.2 Device Reset
After a peripheral has been secured, malicious software inside the non-secure
kernel or framework can try to subvert security by rebooting the entire device. Such
a reboot could happen without the user necessarily noticing (while the device was
idle) and could even be remotely triggered.
One option is to make device policies persistent in the SeKernel, such that
they would be applied whenever the device is booted. While technically feasible
(and indeed quite trivial), this option affects usability. Upon boot, the non-secure
kernel (Linux) probes available devices based on the device tree, and may not set up
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the device files and other software correctly if the probe fails (which it would if the
device were secured upon boot.) In turn, parts of the Android framework may not
initialize, leaving the device in a unstable/unusable state. Without a kernel rewrite
or support, it is difficult (if not impossible) to uniformly re-enable devices that were
protected at boot.
Instead, we adopt the following policy: the non-secure kernel can reset the
device only if there are no disabled devices. Otherwise, the SeKernel does not allow
the non-secure kernel to invoke PSCI [108] calls that are used to reset the processor.
This design choice has the following implications: first, no code, including
remote exploits, in the non-secure kernel can reboot the device if any peripheral is
protected. On the other hand, when the device is rebooted, the regular non-secure
kernel probes can proceed as usual, and the device reboots in a fully usable state.
Further, the SeKernel does not need to keep persistent state about policies, since
the device always reboots with all peripherals accessible to the non-secure kernel.
When the non-secure kernel needs to reset the device (e.g., after OS or software
updates), the user must first run the SeCloak app and remove all protections.
The user may, at times, need to reboot the device after protection has been
applied. For instance, the non-secure kernel or Android may become unresponsive
due to bugs or attacks. To address this scenario, within the SeKernel, we recognize
a hardware key sequence that the user can input to initiate a reset. Since physical
user input is necessary for the device to be reset, this is a safe option, in that the
user is aware that the device is booting into a unprotected state.
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4.6 Evaluation
We use the Boundary Devices Nitrogen6Q development board to run our ex-
periments, which contains an i.MX6 SoC with a quad-core ARM A9 processor with
TrustZone security extensions. We use Android Nougat 7.1.1 with the Linux kernel
version 4.1.15, both of which are provided by Boundary Devices. The SeKernel
implementation is based on our custom fork of OP-TEE [60]. OP-TEE is a OS for
implementing secure applications over TrustZone; SeKernel heavily modifies and re-
duces the OP-TEE codebase. Specifically, SeKernel retains OP-TEEs kernel thread-
ing and debugging support. SeKernel’s MMU code is also based on OP-TEE. The
device drivers required for SeCloak (e.g., framebuffer and GPIO keypad), device
tree parsing, instruction interception and emulation, and the code for securing de-
vice state was developed specifically for the SeKernel.
We first present results to quantify the size of the TCB, both in terms of the
lines of code as well as the interface exposed to the non-secure kernel. Next, we
evaluate the overhead due to intercepting and emulating accesses and show that,
while there is a fair amount of overhead for individual instructions, the reduction in
overall system performance is negligible.
4.6.1 Size of TCB
In Table 4.1, we show a breakdown of the lines of code for our SeKernel
implementation. “Core” consists of all non-driver and non-library code in the
SeKernel. This code handles core SeKernel functionality, such as: memory man-
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LOC Breakdown
Type C Src C Hdr ASM Total Stmt
Core 3233 2357 1391 6981 3781
Drivers
CSU 45 9 0 54 29
Device Tree 401 57 0 458 261
Frame Buffer 146 29 0 175 113
GPIO 562 15 0 577 284
GPIO Keypad 169 14 0 183 89
<Other> 579 167 0 746 265
Drivers Total 1902 291 0 2193 1041
Libraries
libfdt 1220 350 0 1570 840
bget/malloc 1421 68 0 1489 797
<Other> 1479 1182 81 2742 1212
Libraries Total 4120 1600 81 5801 2849
Total 9255 4248 1472 14975 7671
Table 4.1: Breakdown of the lines of code (LOC) for different parts of our SeKernel
implementation. We list the LOC according to the language used (and source versus
header) along with the total LOC. “Stmt” refers to number of statements, which
counts lines in assembly (ASM) and semi-colons in C source and headers.
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agement, threading, the secure monitor, SMC handling (e.g., PSCI and CLOAK).
“Drivers” consists of all driver code, which is further broken down into specific
drivers that we added to OP-TEE. The “<Other>” category contains pre-existing
drivers, such as the UART (i.e., console), GIC, and TZASC-380 drivers. The “Frame
Buffer”, “GPIO”, and “GPIO Keypad” drivers are smaller than their Linux coun-
terparts since the secure drivers do not need to support all device functionality.
As listed under “Libraries”, our device tree parsing code relies on libfdt to ex-
tract information from the flattened device tree file that the bootloader places into
RAM. Additionally, the SeKernel uses the bget and malloc support for dynamic
memory allocation. Finally, there are several other libraries and sets of functions
that are aggregated as “<Other>”, such as: snprintk and trace functions (for print-
ing debug info), qsort (for sorting memory regions data structures), and common
standard library functions (e.g., memcpy, strcmp). In general, we could further
reduce our reliance on these libraries but leave this for future work.
In total, our SeKernel comes to just under 15k LOC (∼7.7k statements). The
SeKernel has a limited attack surface in terms of the interfaces that the SeKernel pro-
vides to the non-secure kernel, namely CLOAK SET and CLOAK GET. CLOAK SET
takes one argument, which is a bit vector containing the modes, groups, and classes
that the user wishes to enable or disable; CLOAK GET takes no arguments.
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Instruction Time (µs)




Table 4.2: Time to execute ARM instructions in the non-secure world that make de-
vice accesses. “Linux” execution uses the baseline Linux kernel without any changes.
“Linux+SOM” execution uses the baseline Linux kernel but changing the device
memory regions to enforce strong ordering of accesses. For “Emulated” execution,
we configure the SeKernel to protect access to the WiFi controller and emulate the
instructions that result in data aborts.
4.6.2 Emulation Overhead
We perform two experiments to analyze the performance overhead introduced
by emulating non-secure instructions that access devices. We focus on the case where
the emulation is allowed, such as when devices are shared between the non-secure
and secure world (e.g., GPIO) or when multiple devices (one of which is disabled)
belong to the same hardware firewall protection group.
In Table 4.2, we show the time taken to execute a single ARM load (ldr) or
store (str) instruction that access a 32-bit device register on the WiFi controller.
We issued each instruction one million times to compute the time taken for each in-
dividual instruction, and averaged this time over five trials. We varied the execution
between “Linux”, “Linux+SOM”, and “Emulated” modes. For “Linux” execution,
we use the baseline Linux kernel without any changes, while for “Linux+SOM”
we change the attributes for device memory regions to enforce strong ordering of
memory accesses (required for interception and emulation, see Section 4.4.6). For



















Figure 4.4: Time taken for upload and download transfers of a 10 MB file to com-
plete over WiFi. “Linux”, “Linux+SOM”, and ”Emulated” correspond execution
modes evaluated in Table 4.2
troller via the hardware firewall (i.e., CSU) registers and set the emulation policy
to allow accesses to the WiFi controller’s MMIO registers.
The requirement of strongly-ordered memory accesses imposes overhead as
expected, as seen by comparing “Linux” and “Linux+SOM”; there is a increase
in instruction time of 2.45x and 1.14x for loads and stores respectively. We also
see a further increase in instruction time from “Linux+SOM” to “Emulated” of
4.22x and 3.61x for loads and stores respectively. Note that, even though tapping
and emulating accesses incurs a fair amount of overhead, high-throughput devices
(e.g., camera, network, and display) rely heavily on DMA transfers for performance
and should remain largely unaffected by emulation overhead (which only affects the
control path for DMA). To that end, we next take a look at a macro-level benchmark
involving the WiFi controller.
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Figure 4.4 show the time taken to transfer files over WiFi when the controller
accesses are emulated (or not). We used the WiFi Speed Test [109] application to
perform the experiments and log the time taken for each of the trials; we used a
laptop as the other endpoint for the file transfers.
The x-axis shows the time taken by the transfer in seconds, and the y-axis
shows the cumulative fraction of transfers that completed within a given time. Each
CDF in Figure 4.4 is computed over 25 runs.
The download and upload performance shows that there is no visible impact
of interception and emulation on WiFi transfers, despite an appreciable increase in
execution time for individual load and store instructions (as shown in Table 4.2).
This is because the WiFi driver and controller, like all modern bulk data transfer
devices, uses DMA to transfer packets. Once the controller firmware is loaded, and
the DMA tables configured, each packet transfer (which can be many thousand
bytes) requires very few (tens) MMIO instructions to initiate the DMA. We believe
this result indicates that SeCloak can be used, even for high performance peripherals,
without significant impact on user-perceived performance.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have describe SeCloak, a system which employs a small-
TCB kernel to allow users to unambiguously and verifiably control peripherals on
their mobile devices. Such a capability has many uses, e.g., it can allow users to
ensure they are not being recorded, or journalists to ensure that they are not being
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tracked by using the WiFi/Bluetooth radios (or other means). The main technical
challenge in designing SeCloak was to ensure that existing mobile device software,
in particular Android and Linux, could co-exist with the secure kernel without code
modification and without affecting device stability and usability. Towards this end,
we have described an instruction emulation mechanism that enables SeCloak without
changing existing software using a very small secure kernel.
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Chapter 5: AIO: Control and Assurance
Over Sensitive I/O Data
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present my work on AIO [2]. AIO is an enforcement layer
that enables transparency and expressive, end-to-end control over the software that
collects, processes, and shares I/O data. AIO provides a framework that allows users
to directly specify and reason about high level data disposition policies, e.g., “my
touchscreen PIN input should only be available to the bank server” or “no untrusted
application may see data from the GPS sensor”. AIO ensures that these policies are
enforced regardless of the behavior or compromise of platform software, including the
OS. AIO relies on an ability to isolate itself from other software on the device, and
to mediate interactions between software and hardware resources. These properties
are derived from key enabling mechanisms provided by the hardware layer, in the
form of virtualization and security extensions.
AIO inherently recognizes and supports many mutually distrusting principals
(e.g., device manufacturer, user), providing a means for: 1) scoping trust to each
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principal, 2) safely composing software from multiple principals, and 3) enabling
more-privileged principals enforce policies over paths constructed by less-privileged
principals. Policies can be used to construct and compose various forms of assurance
over I/O data, such as confidentiality and provenance; AIO provides a way to prove
these assurances through (remote) attestation.
The AIO enforcement layer is a software component that provides necessary
mediation functionality, but the interface it provides is too low-level for direct use
by users or even application developers. We1 introduce a new abstraction, an “ac-
countable path”, that can be used to easily specify and constrain data flow within a
device. Accountable paths can be used to program AIO to provide useful and easy
to reason about properties on how sensitive data is collected and processed within
a AIO-capable device.
The contributions are as follows:
• We introduce the accountable path abstraction, which resolves an impedance mis-
match between the assurances and control desired by users (and other principals)
and the mechanisms supported by existing platforms. This abstraction also pro-
vides a useful way to reason about the state of the system, through attestations
over (parts of) paths.
• We provide a design of the AIO enforcement layer, which executes as a new, iso-
lated, lowest-layer of software and implements the accountable path abstraction.
Our design is focused on limiting the trusted computing base (TCB) and attack
surface of this critical system component.
1This work involved collaborations with Peter Druschel and Bobby Bhattacharjee.
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• We implement and evaluate a prototype of our AIO enforcement layer, leveraging
ARM TrustZone hardware security extensions to meet our isolation and mediation
requirements. This prototype is targeted at the Nitrogen 6X development board,
which has hardware that matches most contemporary smart devices. In our imple-
mentation, we augment Android/Linux with support for accountable paths.
• We demonstrate the functionality and utility of accountable paths in the context of
several application scenarios, such as a banking application with secure transaction
confirmation. We also demonstrate the practicality of our approach through a suite
of benchmarks.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3,
I present our accountable path abstraction and describe the design for AIO. In
Section 5.4, I discuss a prototype implementation of AIO on top of ARM TrustZone.
In Section 5.5, I introduce a toolkit that contains many building blocks for developing
end-to-end secure applications with accountable paths, and discuss how these are
used in various application scenarios. In Section 5.6, I evaluate the performance
of these applications running on top of AIO, as well as microbenchmarks for AIO
itself. Finally, I conclude in Section 5.7.
5.2 High-level Overview
Figure 5.1 shows a high-level overview of the AIO architecture. AIO runs as an
isolated, privileged layer within the system in order to: 1) mediate accesses to hard-





















Figure 5.1: A high-level overview of the AIO architecture.
treats the existing platform software, such as the OS and applications, as a single,
untrusted module (ModuleUT ). AIO executes each module in an isolated (trusted)
execution environment, mediating the module’s access to underlying hardware de-
vices as well as to other modules. This mediation enables enforcement of policies
on inter-module communication and limits the memory/device accesses made by
modules.
AIO recognizes mutually distrusting principals, including the device manufac-
turer, platform provider, user (device owner), and various application and policy
principals. By default, the user is given full privileges on their device, and may
delegate these privileges to other principals, by providing them with (revocable)
credentials. A credential represents a capability assigned to a principal; a capability
provides access rights to a set of hardware device resources and a privilege level for
these accesses. In turn, principals may assign these credentials to the modules they
load. Given a credential, a principal may derive and delegate a (less-privileged) cre-
dential to another principal that has a reduced scope of hardware device resources
and/or a lower privilege level.
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Next, we introduce accountable paths, and discuss how they map to the AIO
module structure, followed by an end-to-end example that shows how accountable
paths can be used to build useful applications.
5.2.1 Accountable Paths
At a high-level, an accountable path represents a software path between hard-
ware resources and a software endpoint; the endpoint may be an application running
on the local device or a (trusted) remote server. Accountable paths are composed
of a sequence of modules that are bound at runtime by AIO. Accountable paths
do not impose a-priori rules on the software composition of modules; as such, they
can be device drivers, critical components of applications, or software layers that
implement well-known interfaces.
Accountable paths support safe composition of software from different princi-
pals, such that more-privileged modules may extend or replace functionality imple-
mented by less-privileged modules. Accountable paths also enables more-privileged
principals to control paths constructed by less-privileged principals by applying poli-
cies along the path. Next, we walk through an end-to-end example to illustrate how
these ideas can be used to create useful applications using accountable paths in AIO.
5.2.2 Workflow Overview
Figure 5.2, shows a high-level overview of an exemplary workflow that uses ac-
countable paths and AIO to build an end-to-end secure mobile banking application.
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Figure 5.2: High-level overview for accountable paths and AIO, discussed in the context
of a banking application that wants to support explicit confirmation transaction from the
user to protect against compromised applications (e.g., keyboard) and/or the platform
software (including the OS). The steps at the top denote a common workflow.
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Decompose In this example, the bank wants to use AIO to get stronger assur-
ances for monetary transactions. In particular, the bank wants assurance that the
user themselves explicitly confirmed the transaction, instead of being generated as
a result of some malicious keyboard application or a compromised OS. The bank
isolates this critical transaction confirmation (TXConf) component within a AIO
module. When installing the bank app, the user delegates credentials to the TX-
Conf module over the display and touchscreen devices at a high privilege level (due
to the sensitivity of the data involved). The bank app can communicate with the
TXConf module through AIO, which it will use whenever there is a transaction that
requires explicit confirmation from the user.
Construct When the TXConf module runs, it interacts with AIO to construct
an accountable path through an interface provided by the UI module (provided by
an AIO toolkit) to the underlying display and touchscreen devices. The modules
along the path are bound at runtime by AIO based on the most-privileged imple-
mentations available for the respective interfaces; these modules may be provided
by multiple principals (as shown by the different colors). Depending on the bank’s
trust assumptions, the bank might choose to supply all the modules along this path
(such that TXConf talks directly to the hardware), or rely on trusted modules, such
as the UI module in this example.
Enforce At this stage, the accountable path constructed between TXConf and
the underlying hardware devices consists of all the functionality, but it doesn’t
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provide the necessary assurances. In AIO, policies are used to obtain these assur-
ances. A policy can be applied to a specific interface, which will subsequently be
enforced when less-privileged modules interact through the interface. Policies in
AIO are expressed as functions that take the interaction as input, and the decision
(allow/deny) as output; policies may optionally modify the interaction itself (e.g.,
changing data) or even invoke other accountable paths. Here, the bank wants to
protect the confidentiality of the user’s touch input from less-privileged principals
(such as the untrusted platform software). The bank applies a policy at the touch
driver interface to deny access to the published touch events for any module with a
lower privilege level than that of TXConf’s credential over the touchscreen. TXConf
will also use policies to ascertain the provenance of a touch event, which must come
from the touch device itself (i.e., hardware interrupt from user physically touching
the screen).
Attest The next step is to interactively attest to the bank’s remote server that
both the functionality (modules) and assurances (policy) are installed correctly. AIO
provides this by attesting to: 1) its own state (a specific version of AIO is loaded
and running), 2) the state of the TXConf module (a specified instance TXConf is
executing within AIO), and 3) the state of the path that TXConf has established.
The bank’s server can verify these remote attestations based on a chain of trust
that AIO roots in the device hardware. These attestations are generated as part of
an interactive protocol over a secure channel established between TXConf and the
server, such that the server can supply nonces for freshness.
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Invoke After requesting the attestations, TXConf can now use the path by in-
voking the various interfaces exported by the UI module to display the details of
the transaction and wait for the user to confirm (or deny) the transaction via the
Y/N buttons. AIO mediates the interactions between the isolated modules along
the path, enforcing policies over these interactions when required. AIO also provides
mechanisms to reason about the attested state of the path across an entire sequence
of interactions, over which the assurances must hold.
Verify If the user confirms the transaction, the TXConf module sends the trans-
action information along with the attestations from the earlier stage to the server
for verification. The server processes the transaction only if the attestations verify.
5.3 Design of AIO
In this section, we describe the design of the AIO enforcement layer. At a high-
level, AIO acts as an extensible reference monitor that mediates all interactions in
between modules, as well as between modules and hardware device resources.
5.3.1 Chain of Trust
We present the chain of trust for AIO in Figure 5.3, which explains the roots of
trust in the system and how trust is derived to enable secure booting, our credential
scheme, and (remote) attestations. AIO relies on three asymmetric key pairs that
form the roots of trust in the system: the device key (PD, KD), the user key (PU ,
KU), and the attestation key (PA, KA). The device manufacturer provides the device
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Figure 5.3: The chain of trust for AIO, broken down into the elements related to secure
boot, credentials, and attestations. The device (D), user (U) and attestation (A) key pairs
form the roots of trust.
key and the attestation key, as well as an initial version of the user key (which the
user will update later). PD, PU , and (PA, KA) are stored in secure, tamper-proof,
non-volatile storage which is commonly available on modern hardware; KD and KU
are not stored on the device.
Secure boot relies on both the device key and user key. We assume there is a
boot ROM that is responsible for loading and executing a second-stage bootloader;
both of these are provisioned by the device manufacturer and trusted. The boot
ROM uses PD to verify: 1) the measurement of the bootloader prior to executing it,
and 2) the hash of the trusted specification of the hardware (DT). The bootloader
uses PU to verify the measurement of AIO before executing it. At this point, we have
a version of AIO that the user trusts loaded onto the system prior to the (untrusted)
platform software.
The user key is used as part of our credential scheme to delegate access rights
to other principals in AIO, which we discuss next. The attestation key is used for
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bootstrapping our remote attestation scheme (discussed later).
5.3.2 Credentials
The credential scheme is backed by a trusted specification of the hardware
that describes the full set of hardware resources present on the device and how
they are interconnected. We rely on the device tree (DT) [103], as described in
Section 3.3 to serve as the basis for our hardware specification, and introduce several
new properties that are necessary for AIO. The aio-deps property contains the
names of all non-standard properties that capture any dependencies on other devices;
the set of standard properties includes interrupts and clocks . The aio-prot property
associates the device with a particular hardware protection domain; on the i.MX6
SoC, this would reference the CSU with a resource specifier that contains the CSL
register index. The aio-class property for each peripheral device to associate it
with one or more high-level classes of devices (e.g., “Touchscreen”). The aio-class
property, along with the compatible property, can be used in capabilities to specify
devices.
5.3.2.1 Credential Scheme
AIO mints unforgeable capabilities at runtime and assigns them to modules;
the modules use these credentials in building accountable paths. A capability (D,
L) provides the right to interact with device D at priority level L. The device D
refers to a device node described in the trusted hardware specification. The priority
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level L encodes privilege levels, where L is an integer value in [−∞,∞] with lower
values corresponding to higher privileges.
A capability (D, L) can be used to derive a less-privileged capability (D′, L′),
where D′ must either be D itself or a child of D as specified in the device tree
hierarchy, and L′ ≥ L. The most-privileged capability is (/, −∞), as it consists of
the root of the hierarchy (/) and priority value (−∞).
A capability (D, L) may be assigned to a principal P via a credential [PP , (D,
L)]KP ′ , where PP is the public key for P . The credential is signed by KP ′ , which
is the private key for another principal P ′. In order for a credential to be valid,
the capability (D, L) must be derived from one of the capabilities assigned to the
signing principal P ′. We bootstrap the credential system with self-signed version of
the most-privileged credential for the user: [PU , (/, −∞)]KU .
A capability (D, L) also implies the right to interact with all devices that D
depends on, as per the hardware specification. These dependencies are typically
expressed over a subset of the resources (e.g., UART controller depends on IRQ 30).
We also allow capabilities to be directly delegated to a specific set of resources for
a device by annotating D, which is useful for cases such as the user assigning an
application a particular color for the notification LED (see Section 5.5.1).
5.3.3 Modules
A module consists of executable code and static, pre-initialized data. At run-
time, modules may allocate memory within a fixed sized heap. A principal may
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associate one or more credentials Ci = [PCredi , (D, L)]KSigi with a module by com-
puting signatures over the module’s code and data using KCredi , which AIO can
verify with PCredi . After verifying the signatures, AIO mints and assigns the ca-
pabilities to the module. All interactions between modules, and ultimately with
hardware devices, are mediated by AIO.
We treat all untrusted software, such as the untrusted OS and any applications
it hosts, as if they are logically contained in a single module ModuleUT that is
assigned (/, ∞). While this capability allows the module to derive capabilities for
any particular device (since / is the common root), it may never derive a capability
with a higher privilege level than∞ (which is the least-privileged level). This module
may export default implementations of interfaces through AIO to other modules
(which can be overridden by a more-privileged implementation), and likewise bind
to interfaces implemented by other modules (subject to all policies on that interface).
5.3.4 Programming AIO
The I/O stack in AIO is composed of communicating isolated modules, similar
in spirit to Binder IPC [110] and prior research on implementing a path abstrac-
tion [101, 102, 111]. At a high level, modules interact using function calls akin to
RPCs; underneath, AIO implements a message passing architecture and enforces
policies over inter-module communication.
Table 5.1 lists the API calls AIO provides to modules along with a high-
level description of what they do. Call, Publish, Wait, and Reply represent a
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standard API for communication via message passing. Assign and Derive are used
in managing the set of capabilities for a module, either minting new capabilities
through assigned credentials or deriving new, less-privileged capabilities. Next, we
focus on the Export, Bind, Apply, Enforce, and Attest * calls.
Function Description
Export(Intf, Cap) → Desc/Error Exports an implementation of an inter-
face
Bind(Intf, Cap) → Desc/Error Binds to an existing interface implemen-
tation
Apply(Intf, Cap, Filter) → Desc/Error Applies a policy to an interface
Call(Desc, MsgIn) → MsgOut/Error Invokes the bound function implementa-
tion and returns the output
Publish(Desc, Msg) → Error Publishes a message to an event sub-
scriber
Wait(Descs) → (Desc, Msg, Cap)/Error Waits for an incoming event on a set of
descriptors
Reply(Msg) → Error Replies to the caller of a function with
the computed output
Enforce(Act [, Msg]) → Error Enforces a policy by specifying the action
and optional data modification
Assign(Cred, Signature) → Cap/Error Assigns a credential at runtime via sig-
nature over the module’s code
Derive(Cap, D, L) → Cap/Error Derives a new capability of (D, L) from
an existing capability
Attest AIO(Nonce) → Quote Returns an attestation over the initial
state of AIO
Attest Self(Nonce) → Quote Returns an attestation over the initial
state of the calling module
Attest Path(Desc, Nonce [, Pin]) → Quotes Returns attestations over the modules
along the specified path
Table 5.1: API functions that AIO provides to modules. Abbreviations: Cap =
Capability, Cred = Credential, Desc = Descriptor, Filter = Policy Filter, Intf =
Interface, and Msg = Message.
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5.3.4.1 Export and Bind
Export allows modules to provide implementations of named/typed interfaces
that other modules will construct paths to via Bind. The capability provided to
Export serves to restrict the set of modules that can Bind to the implementa-
tion. Given a Bind request with capability (D, L), AIO attempts to construct a
path to the most-privileged implementation that matches (D, ∗). Note that these
bindings may change over time as the set of implementations changes; if a new,
more-privileged implementation is introduced then the binding module will receive
a revocation event and subsequently call Bind again.
AIO supports synchronous and asynchronous interfaces. For a synchronous
interface, the calling module will invoke the implementation via Call with the input
parameters; the exporting module receives the call via Wait and responds via Reply.
For an asynchronous interface, the exporting module receives subscriber descriptors
via Wait and may later Publish events to subscribers (who receive the events via
Wait).
When a module receives an call event for an exported interface via Wait, it can
modify its behavior based on the capability of the caller (likewise for subscribers).
The implementation may use the privilege level of the caller to, for instance, multi-
plex requests from multiple callers where the most-privileged caller gets the highest
priority. Additionally, if the capability of the caller is tagged with a resource, the
callee may interpret this resource information to constrain the events it publishes
to the subscriber for an asynchronous interface, or to deny (or modify) accesses for
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a synchronous interface. For a more concrete example, consider an application pro-
viding an interface to the set the color of the notification LED. Credentials for the
LED may be associated with resource information describing the set of valid colors;
if not tagged with a resource, all colors are valid.
5.3.4.2 Apply and Enforce
Modules can apply a policy to a named/typed interface by calling Apply. The
capability provided to Apply serves to restrict the set of paths this policy applies to.
Given a policy with capability (DP , LP ) and a binding module with capability (DB,
LB), the policy will be applied if LP ≤ LB. Policies may also be applied if they are
assigned a resource-tagged capability. Given a binding with capability (DB.R, LB)
for the same resource, the policy will be applied if LP ≤ LB. Given a binding with
capability (DB, LB), the implementing module must determine whether or not the
policy should apply on a per-invocation of the interface by interpreting the resource
information R. The filter argument provided to Apply specifies whether the policy
should apply on the Call and/or Reply sides of the interface.
In handling a Call (or similarly a Publish) that a given policy applies to,
AIO issues policy enforcement requests that the policy module receives via Wait.
In response to such a request, the policy module invokes Enforce to let AIO know
whether the interaction should be allowed or denied, and may optionally modify the
data involved in the interaction. By default, AIO issues an enforcement requests in
order of privilege from most to least; this enables more-privileged policies to deny
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the interaction before less-privileged policies can operate over it. However, AIO
also provides a facility which allows more-privileged policies to execute last as well.
This mechanism is similar to pre- and post-hooks in event-based systems.
Assurances Policies are extremely powerful components in AIO, that not only
enable access control but are also used to obtain assurances such as data confiden-
tiality and integrity.
A module may protect confidentiality along a path by applying a policy with
a certain privilege level L that denies access to the interfaces by any less-privileged
module. The application of this policy may fail in the case that a module providing
functionality along the path is less-privileged; when AIO returns this error, the
module can choose whether it is willing to lower the level of confidentiality protection
(or not).
A module may also protect integrity of data along a path against unauthorized
modification. In practice, there are many ways to achieve integrity assurance, and
AIO is flexible in supporting a variety of different mechanisms. First, a module may
consider integrity to be maintained as long as all modules along a path are trusted.
These trust assumptions of the module may be specified in the form of hashes of
modules whose implementations are trusted to be correct, or (more broadly) in the
form of public keys associated with principals that are trusted to correctly implement
and provision modules. In other cases, it may not be possible to enumerate (or fully
satisfy) the set of trust assumptions, potentially as a result of trying to maximize
re-use of existing, untrusted code. Therefore, the module can employ policies that
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apply to the inputs and outputs of any untrusted modules along a path to enforce
behavior specifications over their accesses.
5.3.4.3 Attestations
AIO supports establishing a secure channel between a module and a remote
server, which can be used for communication and as part of the remote attestation
protocol. While the remove server should be able to authenticate a running AIO
instance, the server should not be able to learn a unique identifier that can be used
to link AIO instances over time. To this end, we rely on a group signature scheme
similar to Intel EPID used in SGX [43], in particular the Boneh-Boyen-Shacham
short group signature scheme [112]. The attestation key pair (PA, KA) consists of
the group public key PA for all of the manufacturers’ devices, while KA corresponds
to a per-device private key. The remote server will learn that a device belongs to
the group of the manufacturers’ devices (through a certificate chain that certifies
PA), but not the particular device.
Communication between modules and remote servers are relayed by a non-
secure network proxy; we use standard key exchange protocols to establish shared
keys between remote services and secure modules.
Attesting to AIO The most basic attestation is over the initial state of AIO
itself. While loading and verifying the AIO image, the trusted bootloader computes
a measurement MAIO over the initial state of AIO. The bootloader generates a new
ECDSA key pair (PAIO, KAIO) and certifies the public key by signing a message
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[MAIO, PAIO]KA . The bootloader passes the key pair and the certificate to AIO for
use in higher-level attestations. This scheme follows from the key derivation and
attestation approach in RIoT [113], but modified to make use of group signatures.
A module may request an attestation of AIO via the Attest AIO API call,
passing in a nonce. In response, AIO returns the signed message from the bootloader,
which certifies the public key PAIO, and a signature over the nonce using KAIO. The
verifier has knowledge of the PA associated with the device, which it uses to verify the
certificate for PAIO, which proves the existence of a trusted boot chain to load AIO.
The verifier will then check whether MAIO included in the certificate corresponds to
a known, trusted instance of AIO; if so, the verifier uses the included PAIO to finally
verify the signature of the nonce.
Attesting to a Module A module may also request an attestation over its own
initial state to send to the remove server. When AIO loads modules, it computes and
stores a measurement MMOD of the initial state of the executable code and static
data; the credentials assigned to the module are not included in this measurement.
A module may request this attestation via the Attest Self API call, which returns
[MMOD, Nonce]KAIO . The verifier uses the PAIO certified by the attestation to AIO
to check the signature of this message, and also checks whether MMOD corresponds
to a trusted instance of the module.
Attesting to an Accountable Path AIO provides attestations over the full
path between a module and underlying hardware resources. A module may invoke
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the Attest Path API call to request attestations over all modules along a path
specified by a descriptor, which returns a signature over a graph data structure G
which represents the path [G, Nonce]KAIO . The graph structure consists of nodes
corresponding to the modules (and in particular their measurement); the edges
represent a binding from one module to another for a particular interface. The
verifier uses the PAIO certified by the attestation to AIO to check the signature of
this message, and also checks the complete state of the path.
Note that these path attestations capture the instantaneous state of the system
at the time of the request. However, it is typically necessary to reason about the
state of the path across some sequence of operations; for example, the expected path
for a trusted UI is maintained while the user interacts with the interface. To this
end, a module may optionally supply the “Pin” parameter to instruct AIO that the
module wants to be notified if the path deviates from the attested state. Later, the
module can unpin the path by invoking Attest Path again but with an “Unpin”
parameter.
5.4 Implementation
We rely on the ARM TrustZone hardware security extensions for our prototype
implementation. Figure 5.4 shows an overview of the important components of
the hardware platform, along with how we organized the software to augment the
existing Android/Linux OS with support for accountable paths. AIO runs in the







































Figure 5.4: Overview of the important components of the hardware platform and organi-
zation of software involved in augmenting Android/Linux with accountable paths via AIO
.
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existing Android/Linux OS and applications run in the non-secure world. AIO
executes all modules in isolated, trusted execution environments in secure world user
mode. To expose accountable paths to the non-secure world, we created a Linux
kernel module that acts as an untrusted proxy to AIO; the proxy communicates with
AIO via the (SMC) interface, where AIO provides a similar API to that described in
Table 5.1.
Our implementation of AIO is very loosely based on OP-TEE [60], an OS for
the ARM TrustZone secure world that provides execution environments for trusted
applications that are invoked by the untrusted OS. We primarily make use of OP-
TEE support for configuring the MMU, loading ELF binaries, secure monitor han-
dlers, and drivers for the GIC and serial port devices.
5.4.1 Hardware Protections
AIO relies on hardware protection mechanisms to mediate device accesses
and to isolate itself from the rest of the system. The TrustZone Address Space
Controller (TZASC) mediates accesses to RAM, and can be configured to allow or
deny accesses to regions according to the world and type (R/W). AIO configures the
TZASC to protect the regions of memory occupied by AIO (and all loaded modules)
from all non-secure world accesses. The Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC) is a
TrustZone aware device that enables the secure world OS to assign specific interrupts
as either secure world or non-secure world, and limits the priority of non-secure world
interrupts (e.g., to avoid DoS attacks). Finally, the Central Security Unit (CSU)
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mediates accesses to MMIO devices. This is a manufacturer-specific IP block from
NXP, which is found on the hardware platform we use in our evaluation; however,
similar functionality is provided in most TrustZone instantiations. The secure world
OS can configure the CSU to allow or deny accesses to devices based on the world
and mode; optionally, when the access is denied, the CSU can be configured to
deliver the fault to the secure world monitor. These latter two protections are used
by our built-in modules, which we discuss in Section 5.4.2.
5.4.2 Modules
AIO executes all modules in isolated, trusted execution environments in secure
world user mode. AIO loads modules that come in the form of signed ELF binary
images along with a set of credentials. AIO verifies that the credentials are valid
and then uses the public keys bound to the credentials to verify the signatures over
the ELF image. Each module runs in a separate address space in secure world user
mode, and communicates with AIO via the API exposed through the AIO system
call interface (see Table 5.1).
Inter-Module Communication AIO enables inter-module communication with
an interface description language that is similar to seL4 [98]. Each interface specifies
a message that consists of a set of values (i.e., data words) and a set of items. Items
support transferring a variable-sized data buffer or sharing a memory mapping for
a region that contains the data. A buffer item consists of a region of memory in the
sender’s address space which is copied to a region in the receiver’s address space. A
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mapping item consists of a region of memory at the page granularity which will be
granted to (or shared with) the receiver. The specification for a buffer item consists
of the maximum size of the buffer to be sent or received, and (if receiving) the
address of the buffer in the module’s address space. The specification for a mapping
item consists of the maximum size of the mapping to be sent or received, and (if
receiving) the required access rights for the mapping (i.e., read or write).
AIO maintains two queues of messages for each module: one consisting of
empty messages that can be acquired, and one consisting of filled messages to be
returned from future Wait calls. AIO maps each message into both the module’s ad-
dress space as well as AIO’s own address space in order to support efficient transfers
from one module to another, without the need to use a temporary in-AIO buffer.
Each thread for a module is assigned a single message at a given time. A thread
begins execution at the “AIO entry” point, which passes in the message assigned to
the thread. When a thread calls Wait and there is an available filled message, the
call immediately returns with the message; Otherwise, the thread attaches itself to
its module’s wait queue until a message is filled. When a thread invokes a Call on
a bound descriptor, AIO identifies the next module in the call path and attempts
to acquire a message; if successful, AIO transfers the message to the destination
module, places it on the filled queue, and notifies a waiting thread to run (if any). If
unsuccessful, the thread attaches itself to the destination module’s wait queue until
an empty message is supplied to be used in the transfer.
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Built-in Modules For modules to interact with hardware devices, AIO must pro-
vide some platform-specific, built-in modules upon which higher-level drivers can be
written; for our platform, the set consists of a memory-mapped I/O (MMIO) mod-
ule and a interrupt controller (IRQ) module. The MMIO module exports interfaces
to read and write device registers (e.g., “MMIO Read32”). The IRQ module acts
as a driver for the primary interrupt controller on the CPU, handling IRQ and FIQ
exception modes and exporting interfaces for managing IRQs to other modules (e.g.,
“IRQ Enable”). These modules hold the most-privileged capability for their device.
To reduce overhead, the MMIO module provides a “MMIO Map” interface
that allows a calling module to request that a particular physical address region be
mapped into their address space. While “mmaped” accesses are extremely efficient,
they do not inherently support interposition of policy as they side-step the path
interfaces. Therefore, when a policy is applied to the read or write interface, AIO
must configure the hardware CSU protections to force such accesses to generate
faults that AIO can subsequently handle (similar to SeCloak [1]). In handling the
fault, AIO emulates the instruction that caused the access fault, invoking the path
for the MMIO access function and enforcing the applied policy.
5.4.3 Accountable Paths with Linux
In our implementation, we retrofit Linux/Android with support for account-
able paths by exposing AIO through a proxy Linux kernel module. One of the
primary goals is to enable AIO modules to make use of the existing platform soft-
88
ware to minimize their TCB. This is useful when modules do not require assurances
from certain parts of the stack, or are able to provide these assurances at the ends
(e.g., TLS channel over untrusted networking stack).
Additionally, we expose accountable paths to Linux via “shims” which al-
low the existing platform software to make use of functionality provided by more-
privileged modules in AIO. We describe the operations of shims through an example
for the touchscreen, in which a driver is loaded as a secure module in AIO. The driver
module applies deny policies to its lower-level interfaces (i.e., I2C and IRQ) to pro-
tect against their use by other, less-privileged software. These policies prevent the
(untrusted) touchscreen driver in Linux from making accesses; however, assuming
there is no policy in place to prevent access to the touch events, Linux should still be
able to consume them. Therefore, the Linux-resident touchscreen shim subscribes
to the Touch Event interface in AIO, and also registers itself as an touchscreen de-
vice to the input subsystem in Linux (in place of the existing touchscreen driver).
Whenever the shim receives a published event, it marshals the data and appropri-
ately signals the input subsystem that a touch event occurred; the applications built
on top of the input subsystem are unaware, as they still access the touch data via
the standard sysfs interface (e.g., /dev/input/event0).
5.4.4 Policy Interposition
When modules interact through an interface with applied policies, AIO issues
enforcement requests to the modules that applied the policy. Given the fact that
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multiple policies from different principals might apply to a path invocation, the
overhead of message copying and context switching may be significant. Therefore,
we allow policies to be expressed as extended Berkeley Packet Filter(eBPF) [95]
programs that can be verified, just-in-time compiled2, and executed within AIO
itself. The program context for AIO is similar to that of traditional XDP BPF
programs, which provide a very low-level view of packet data by specifying pointers
to the start and end of the packet data buffer. In our case, AIO passes in a context
parameter that specifies the start and end of a “serialized” message which contains
the core message structure concatenated with any data contain in buffer items.
The header of the eBPF image specifies the singular interface that the policy
applies to and includes a set of credentials for the policy. Each invocation of the
eBPF program constitutes a separate enforcement request by AIO over communi-
cation through that interface. Unlike policies implemented by full-fledged modules,
eBPF-based policies apply to a single interface and cannot construct/invoke paths
to other modules while handling an enforcement request. We support a simple tuple
space data structure for storing data across executions.
5.5 Use Cases
We begin by discussing a toolkit that we developed for building secure appli-
cations, followed by different application scenarios and how they might be realized
in AIO.
2Currently, verification and compilation are performed outside of AIO.
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5.5.1 Toolkit
We provide a set of (trusted) modules that serve as building blocks for ap-
plications. Unlike commercial TEE solutions [16–19], our set of building blocks
is not limited to a fixed set that is only provided by a single principal, and may
be replaced/extended to fit each application’s trust assumptions. Next, we discuss
several of these modules and the properties they provide.
5.5.1.1 Remote Proxy
Often a principal might only require a minimal secure module running on
the user’s device that interacts with software running on a (trusted) remote server
owned by the principal. The “Remote Proxy” toolkit module allows a remote server
to interact with AIO as if the remote software was running as local module.
Initially, the proxy module is loaded by supplying one or more credentials that
may be used for networking, along with an input specifying a network endpoint
for the remote server. The proxy and remote server participate in an interactive
protocol, such that: 1) the proxy provides attestations over the measurements AIO
and the proxy module itself, and 2) the server sends credentials with the necessary
capabilities and signatures over the measurement of the proxy. The proxy module
passes these credentials to AIO via the Assign call, which will mint and assign the
appropriate capabilities to this instantiation of the proxy module. Afterwards, the
remote server sends commands to the proxy module which mirror the API calls
between local modules and AIO (see Table 5.1). The proxy module is responsible
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for invoking the corresponding system calls on behalf of the remote server, allowing
the server to construct and invoke paths, apply policies, and request attestations
over system state.
5.5.1.2 Display Composer
The “Display Composer” toolkit module serves to securely compose multiple,
individual display layers from various modules to generate a final framebuffer that
is rendered to the user via the display. The composer looks at the calling module’s
capability to determine its privilege level. The composer uses these privilege levels to
serve as the Z-axis values for ordering the layers: more-privileged layers are displayed
above less-privileged layers, with the untrusted layer acting as the background.
5.5.1.3 Notification LED
The “Notification LED” toolkit module provides an interface for setting the
color of the notification LED to unambiguously notify the user that they are in-
teracting with a trusted application. This prevents an attack whereby a malicious
application could spoof the UI of a trusted application, potentially allowing an
attacker to learn sensitive information the user would enter (e.g., banking authen-
tication information). Given a credential for the LED device, a module may use
this building block to turn on/off the LED; the module may also prevent other,
less-privileged applications from configuring the LED by applying a policy that de-
nies such accesses. When delegating credentials to various applications, the user
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may assign each application a specific color (or part of the spectrum) by tagging
the device in the credential with a resource specifier that encodes the whitelist of
colors. The LED module looks at the calling module’s capability to check for this
tag; if present, the LED module checks to see if the requested color value is in the
whitelist.
5.5.2 Application Scenarios
Next, we discuss several different application scenarios, focusing on the desired
assurances and how AIO can help to provide them.
5.5.2.1 Mobile Banking
Mobile banking applications provide rich functionality including the ability to
deposit checks, transfer money, and view financial records; however, such function-
ality also makes these applications a prime target for attackers. Many components
of these banking applications can benefit from being built on top of accountable
paths, such as PIN input-based authentication and explicit user confirmation for
transactions (as discussed in Section 5.2).
When the user opens the banking application, they must authenticate them-
selves to the bank’s remote server. This typically involves the application requesting
a PIN (or password) from the user and sending it to the remote server for validation
and establishing an authenticated session. It is important to protect the confiden-
tiality of the user’s PIN against attacks from malicious software or a compromised
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Figure 5.5: Overview of how the Bank TXConf module uses AIO to support explicit
confirmation of user transactions.
OS; however, it is not necessary to protect integrity, since an incorrect PIN will
simply cause the authentication to fail. The authentication module must apply
policies that deny any less-privileged modules from snooping on the entered PIN (or
lower-level touch events).
Figure 5.5 presents an overview of how explicit user confirmation for trans-
actions may be realized on top of AIO. The TXConf module establishes a secure
communication channel with the remote server, via TLS over a TCP connection via
an untrusted network stack (not shown). The TXConf module begins by requesting
attestation quotes over the initial state of AIO and the module itself; the nonces
from the server are used to ensure freshness of these quotes. Afterwards, the TX-
Conf module constructs and attests to a path to the interface exposed by the UI
module, which is included in the toolkit. In order to make sure that this attesta-
tion holds across the invocation of the path, the TXConf module requests that this
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path be pinned. Next, the TXConf module invokes the path to configure the user
interface for displaying the transaction details and to wait for the user to confirm
(or deny) the transaction. If the user confirms the transaction, the TXConf module
will send the transaction information and attestation quotes to the remote server.
If the quotes are valid, the server will execute the transaction.
5.5.2.2 System Integrity Policy
CLKSCREW [114] is one example of an attack on system integrity, involving
the misconfiguration of the CPU voltage and frequency regulators in order to cause
faults in secure world computation (which can even lead to the exposure of crypto-
graphic secrets). With AIO, we have the opportunity to provide a reliable, software-
based defense via installation of a straight-forward policy that mediates accesses to
the CPU voltage and frequency scaling registers by less-credentialed software (e.g.,
Linux CPUFreq driver). We present pseudocode in Algorithm 1 which captures
how such a policy module can be implemented in AIO, using the API described in
Table 5.1. We assume the policy module has credentials over the CPU voltage and
frequency regulator device(s) that are accessed via MMIO.
The module applies a policy over calls to “MMIO Write”; since this is an
access control policy, we only need to register for the first execution phase for the
policy filter. In addition, the module binds to “MMIO Read” in order to read
the current values of the frequency and voltage regulators. When AIO issues a
policy enforcement request for “MMIO Write” to the module, the module checks if
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Algorithm 1 Pseudocode an AIO policy module to protect against CLKSCREW [114]
attacks that target system integrity.
1: function GetAction(volt, freq)
2: return Allow if valid pair, otherwise Deny
3: function Module Entry()
4: rIntf = { ”MMIO Read”, inVals = 1, outVals = 1 }
5: rDesc = Bind(rIntf, 0)
6: wIntf = { ”MMIO Write”, inVals = 2 }
7: wDesc = Apply(wIntf, 0, FILTER CALL INPUT)
8: loop
9: desc, msg = Wait()
10: if desc == wDesc then
11: addr, value = msg.values
12: action = Allow
13: if addr == VOLT ADDR then
14: freqMsg = Call(rDesc, { FREQ ADDR })
15: action = GetAction(value, freqMsg.values[0])
16: else if addr == FREQ ADDR then
17: voltMsg = Call(rDesc, { VOLT ADDR })
18: action = GetAction(voltMsg.values[0], value)
19: Enforce(action)
a relevant device register is being addressed; if yes, the module checks if the resulting
(voltage, frequency) point would exist within the safe operating limits for the device.
We implemented and applied this policy on our hardware platform, deriving
the functions that describe the highest voltage allowed for each frequency (and vice-
versa) based on the hardware parameters. In order to test this policy, we instructed
the Linux cpufreq driver to try to set the voltage and frequency regulators beyond
the limits, which the policy denies. Additionally, we instructed the Linux cpufreq
driver to set values within the valid operating limit (and read the current values),
which the policy allows.
5.5.2.3 Geofencing
Let’s consider a geofencing application that collects GPS sensor samples to
determine the set of policies to apply and enforce at any given time, where each
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Figure 5.6: An example set of accountable paths for a geofencing app (and other apps)
that use GPS location sensor samples. The user delegates capabilities with different
privilege levels to the applications. The user can apply policies on the paths, such as
reducing the resolution of (or denying access to) the GPS samples.
policy is associated with a specific geographic region. We show the modules and
accountable paths involved in Figure 5.6. The GPS driver exposes a “GetSample”
interface to other modules that returns standard information such as (lat,lon) coor-
dinates. The GPS driver communicates with the hardware GPS radio device via a
serial (UART) bus, using standard NMEA protocol; the UART driver communicates
with the hardware bus controller via memory-mapped I/O (MMIO). Let’s assume
these drivers are provisioned by the device manufacturer.
When the user installs the geofencing application, the user assigns the appli-
cation principal a capability for the GPS device with a high privilege level. The
geofencing module will use this capability to construct an accountable path to the
“GetSample” interface associated with the GPS device. When constructing the
accountable path, the geofencing module specifies its security properties and trust
assumptions. In this particular use case, the module does not require confidentiality
along the path; however, the geofencing application provider may only trust the
device manufacturer’s implementation of the GPS driver to be correct. In this case,
the device manufacturer’s driver is the most-privileged implementation running, so
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the platform successfully constructs the path.
The user may wish to install policies to reduce the resolution of the GPS
sensor samples for other, less-privileged applications. The user can delegate a more-
privileged capability for the GPS sensor device to a policy which will apply to
the “GetSample” interface and modify the resulting data, such as reducing the
resolution of the coordinates to city-level granularity by dropping some number of
decimal places. As shown in Figure 5.6, multiple policies may be applied at varying
privilege levels. In this case, there are two policies that affect the data along the
path for the less-privileged applications.
5.6 Evaluation
In our evaluation, we aim to demonstrate the practicality of our approach and
implementation by measuring the performance of AIO operations. All evaluations
are performed on the Boundary Devices Nitrogen6Q single-board computer, which
contains an i.MX6 SoC with a quad-core 1 GHz ARM Cortex A9 processor and
1 GB of DRAM. We used the BD070LIC2 touchscreen display, which connects
to the system via an LVDS interface for the display and an I2C interface for the
touchscreen. For our cycle measurements, we rely on the hardware cycle counting
support from the performance monitoring unit; for our timing measurements, we
use the EPIT timer which we configure to tick every 1 µS. For each experiment, we
compute the statistics based on the results of 100 trials. While AIO has multi-core
support, we run these experiments with only a single core enabled.
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Type C Src C Hdr ASM Total
Overall
AIO-Specific 4,274 1,077 426 5,777
Total 90,817 25,454 6,500 122,771
Drivers
CSU 80 9 0 89
GIC 562 18 0 580
TZASC 146 143 0 289
Libraries
libaio 60 169 38 267
libfdt 1,862 419 0 2281
libmbedtls 43,840 9,791 0 53,631
libutils 18,147 3,405 219 21,771
Table 5.2: Breakdown of the lines of code (LOC) for different parts of our AIO
implementation. We list the LOC according to the language used (and source versus
header) along with the total LOC.
5.6.1 Size of TCB
We first present results to quantify the size of the TCB for our implementation
of AIO. In Table 5.2, we quantify the size of the TCB for our implementation of
AIO by showing a breakdown for the lines of code. “Overall” consists of all code,
including drivers and libraries; the AIO-specific portion includes all of the code
except for platform-specific components, MMU handling, and ELF loading. The
“Total“ of 122,771 is a significant overestimate due to the LoC count including
many files from OP-TEE and supporting libraries that are not compiled for AIO
(e.g., trusted application (TA) support). “Drivers” consists of all driver code, which
is further broken down into specific drivers that we added to (or borrowed from) OP-
TEE. “Libraries” consists of all the libraries we use. We rely on libfdt for parsing
the flattened device tree file, libmbedtls for cryptographic functions, and libutils
for various utilities (e.g., standard library functions, bget allocator, tracing); we
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introduced libaio that modules link with to invoke AIO’s API functions.
5.6.2 Baseline
In Table 5.3, we show the results of experiments that measure the simplest
forms of various operations to establish a performance baseline for AIO. We employ
two benchmarking modules that each have a single thread and a message queue of
size two; the SMC experiment uses a separate benchmarking module running in the
non-secure world.
The SMC and SVC calls represent the overhead for communication between
ModuleUT in the non-secure world and all secure world modules with AIO (respec-
tively). SMC handling involves saving (and restoring) more register state. In the
following results, we focus on the SVC interface (i.e., from a secure world module).
Next, we look at the cost to export, bind, and invoke paths to both a null
function interface (with no inputs or outputs) and a null event interface (with no
data). Beyond the basic invocations (i.e., call and publish), we also evaluate the
case when an “Allow” policy is applied to the interface and enforced by AIO; we
consider the cases when the policy is applied by a module and as a standalone eBPF
program. Calling a function interface involves four context switches (essentially two
SVCs), while publishing to an event interface involves only two. The higher standard
deviation for the publish operations is attributed to the fact that the message queue
is of size two for each module. Unlike call, publish does not need to block by
default; however, if no messages are available in the subscriber’s queue, then it will
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Cycles
Operation Notes Mean StdDev
Null SVC Modules to AIO 657 23





Call+Policy Allow 9,930 509




Pub+Policy Allow 8,912 5,988
Pub+Policy* Allow (eBPF) 6,813 3,524
Derive 4,467 1,284
Time (µS)
Operation Notes Mean StdDev
Attest AIO 53,590 172
Attest Self 53,587 160
Attest Path 53,593 162
Table 5.3: Baseline performance results for various operations.
block until a message becomes available for use. Small policies expressed as eBPF
programs improve performance substantially, by a factor of roughly 6x in the case of
function interfaces (521 vs 3184 cycles); this is because AIO can execute eBPF-based
policies safely without context switching to a different protection domain.
Attestations are expensive operations as they include an asymmetric crypto-
graphic signature operation to generate a fresh quote given a nonce passed in by
the calling module. In our implementation, we use the mbed-tls library [115] for
an ECDSA signature scheme using the NIST P-256 curve. If many attestations are
needed in practice, it is possible to reduce this overhead by exchanging a symmetric
key for use in an HMAC-based attestation scheme.
101
Cycles
Operation Notes Mean StdDev
MMIO Write (Call)
Baseline 3,859 517
Policy* Allow (eBPF) 4,642 455
MMIO Write (Mapped)
Baseline 35* 2
Policy* Allow (eBPF) 4,839 342
Trap+Call 3,946 392
Trap 1,723 285
Table 5.4: Built-in MMIO module performance.
5.6.3 Built-in Modules and Drivers
As part of our implementation, we provide two built-in modules, MMIO and
IRQ, that enable higher-level drivers to be written (see Section 5.4.2). We have
also implemented a number of driver modules as part of our toolkit for a variety of
different devices (e.g., GPIO controller, touchscreen). These drivers are functional
ports from the corresponding Linux version, modified to run as modules on top of
AIO. Here, we evaluate the performance characteristics for some of these built-in
and driver modules.
Table 5.4 contains the results from experiments to evaluate the costs associated
with applying policies at the level of MMIO operations. For these experiments, we
used a benchmarking module running in the non-secure world that makes register
accesses to the Clock Control Module (CCM) device. For the baseline mapped
experiment, we measured the cycle count across ten writes to the register due to the
cycle count inaccuracies we witnessed for single instructions. Calls to this interface
require less cycles than calls to the NULL function interface in Table 5.3, since
the MMIO module is built into AIO itself and therefore doesn’t require additional
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Time (µS)
Operation Notes Mean StdDev
Touch Event (Linux) 13,281 746
Touch Event (AIO)
to Module 5,676 55
to Linux 7,046 6,692
Table 5.5: Touchscreen path performance.
context switches. As we can see, the common case where no policy is applied (see
“Baseline”) is significantly improved by issuing writes to mapped memory instead of
invoking the “MMIO Write” interface directly (35 vs 3,859 cycles). And, in the case
policies are applied, issuing writes to mapped memory only incur a small overhead of
less than 200 cycles (roughly 4%). We provide a breakdown of the costs associated
with handling a write to mapped memory while a policy is applied to that region:
“Trap” includes all work to handle the data abort fault and determine the access,
while “Call” includes invoking the path to emulate the access.
Table 5.5 shows the results from experiments for the touchscreen driver to
understand how the latency changes when running the components in AIO. Here,
latency refers to the time between when the interrupt is raised on the GIC (as a result
of a touch) and when the touch event is published. The “Linux” case corresponds
to using the existing drivers in Linux; the “AIO” case substitutes the touchscreen,
I2C, and GPIO drivers with ported implementations running as modules in AIO. We
look at two sub-cases for whether the AIO module publishes touch events to: 1) a
subscribing module, or 2) the Linux shim connected to the input subsystem. In the
“Linux” case, we see that the latency for handling a touch event is roughly 13 ms.
When implemented on AIO, we see that the latency drops to 5-7 ms. This difference
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is largely due to the fact that RUNNING/RUNNABLE threads from AIO modules
have higher priority than any threads from Linux; as long as AIO is active on a
CPU core, it does not give control back to Linux until the idle thread is scheduled.
5.6.4 Summary
Our evaluation benchmarks various aspects of AIO and common I/O devices.
Our results don’t reveal any unexpected performance anomalies, and more impor-
tantly, show that AIO can be implemented on current hardware, and provide suffi-
cient performance to support useful applications. Indeed, we have used the compo-
nents we have evaluated (e.g., touchscreen path) to implement various end-to-end
application applications, including the secure mobile banking scenario discussed in
Section 5.5. All of these applications run stably with no perceptible change in
usability.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have introduced AIO, an isolated enforcement layer that
enables transparency and control over the software stack for handling I/O data,
benefiting both users and application principals. A key component of AIO is the
new accountable path abstraction, which represents a software path between a set of
hardware resources and a local or remote endpoint. This simple abstraction enables
expressive control over how sensitive data is collected, processed, and shared, and
also supports building end-to-end secure applications with proven assurances (e.g.,
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confidentiality). Accountable paths handle multiple (mutually distrusting) princi-
pals, enabling fine delegation of trust and safe composition of software from different
principals that may be contributing various parts of the I/O stack. Through our
implementation efforts, we showed how to apply accountable paths to existing plat-
forms such as Android/Linux, and we demonstrated the practicality of our solution.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, I motivated the need to introduce a new, isolated enforce-
ment layer given the problems facing users with respect to a lack of control and
assurance over how their sensitive data is being collected, used, and shared. My
contributions include the design and implementation of two instantiations of such
an enforcement layer: SeCloak and AIO. These contributions support the following
thesis: Introducing an enforcement layer between the hardware and system software
can enable end-to-end secure applications while giving users fine-grained control over
their devices.
SeCloak addresses a key point in the control policy space for users: providing
on/off control for peripheral devices. SeCloak runs as a platform-agnostic layer
that provides the abstraction of secure, virtual switches that the user can reliably
configure. I showed that it is possible to provide such reliable controls regardless
of the correctness of the rest of the platform software, including the OS. Through
the evaluation, I demonstrated low overhead of our trap-and-emulate approach for
handling coarse-grained hardware protection domains.
AIO introduces a new “accountable path” abstraction that enables construct-
ing and reasoning about the end-to-end I/O stack between application endpoints
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and underlying hardware devices. Accountable paths allow for more expressive
policies to be enforced over the software stack; these policies can be used to derive
various assurances, which AIO provides proof of via attestations over (parts of) the
accountable paths. I solved the problem of supporting many mutually distrusting
principals that contribute various parts of the I/O stack. I demonstrated the utility
of the accountable path abstraction through a variety of application usecases, and
the practicality of AIO through performance benchmarks.
6.1 Future Work
While SeCloak and AIO solve core, technical problems, they also open up
some additional research questions, as well as questions to address in the context of
practical deployments of these systems.
6.1.1 Strengthening Foundations of Trust
A key goal of my work on AIO is to provide assurances over the handling
of sensitive I/O data; however, these assurances naturally rest on any assurances
over the correctness and security properties of AIO itself. Similarly, in SeCloak,
the assurance that devices are disabled according to the user’s settings rests on the
correctness and security properties of the SeKernel. In designing and implementing
both AIO and SeCloak, we strived to expose a narrow interface, minimize the TCB,
and take care in writing and testing the implementation. Both of the enforcement
layers are able to provide their guarantees even if the rest of the platform software
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is compromised. However, we can still do better to strengthen the foundations of
trust in these critical components.
In recent years, there have been many advances in practical formal meth-
ods that can be used to prove correctness and security properties for larger sys-
tems [58, 98, 116]. It would useful to formally verify parts of (or the entire) design
and implementation of these enforcement layers to provide a much higher-level of
assurance.
6.1.2 Usable Security
One of the goals for both AIO and SeCloak is to enable users to have fine-
grained control over their devices. In SeCloak, we provide users the ability to reliably
dictate on/off control for peripherals on their device, such as the microphone and
camera. We present this control to users in the form of secure, virtual switches that
they can interact with through a typical settings menu. We also provide certain
presets that configure settings for given scenarios, such as airplane mode which
reliably disables all radios (e.g., Bluetooth, WiFi, Cellular). While this interface
makes sense to us as developers, it is worth determining whether it is most beneficial
for lay users. Additionally, we make use of an LED to unambiguously notify the
user that they are interacting with the secure part of SeCloak, but understanding
the efficacy of this approach would be useful in comparison to other techniques (e.g.,
background tiles of a secure image known only to the user).
In AIO, the question of usable security is even greater since accountable paths
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provide users with far more expressive policy control than in SeCloak. In addition,
users are tasked with assigning credentials to principals (and their software); these
credentials involve setting the privilege level for the software, which AIO uses to
safely compose the software within the I/O stack and to determine which policies
should be enforced. While accountable paths provide an appropriate abstraction at
the level of the AIO enforcement layer, we envision higher-level abstractions that
can help close the gap in usable security.
6.1.3 Cooperative Enforcement Layers
In both SeCloak and AIO, I assumed minimal cooperation between the enforce-
ment layer and the (untrusted) platform OS. However, when considering deploying
these enforcement layers on contemporary devices, there are several scenarios that
would benefit from more cooperation between these two systems.
In SeCloak, we modify the platform OS only to enable strongly-ordered mem-
ory accesses for all memory mapped regions of device registers. Note that this
modification is not needed for correctness, but rather for maintaining stability and
usability of the device. The SeKernel needs precise data abort faults in order to
trap and handle the access faults from the non-secure world accessing protected
devices; if these were to go unhandled, the system would crash. However, forcing
strongly-ordered memory accesses does introduce overhead for I/O operations, and
only needs to be enabled for the memory regions corresponding to devices that are
disabled via hardware protections. With an (untrusted) module running in the non-
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secure world OS, the SeKernel could notify the OS module when the user explicitly
confirms policy settings that change the set of devices that are protected. At that
point, the OS module could alter the memory mappings for the devices that became
protected (and vice-versa), before returning control back to the SeKernel to config-
ure the protections. The OS could issue a denial of service attack at this point, but
such attacks are outside of our threat model; the OS could simply not submit policy
requests to the SeKernel in the first place from the settings application.
Additionally, such cooperation could be used to invoke device power man-
agement operations prior to protections. However, unlike the case of configuring
strongly-ordered memory accesses, these management operations require interact-
ing with the hardware device. Given that the user has directed SeCloak to disable
the device at this time, we need to make sure that these operations are safe to per-
form. This notion of safety requires a behavior specification over valid accesses that
can be made as part of power management routines to suspend a device, which the
SeKernel could then enforce. How best to express these specifications, or whether
there is a better alternative, is an open challenge.
In AIO, we introduce a (untrusted) proxy module into the platform OS to
expose support for accountable paths to the platform OS and applications running
on top. AIO maintains its own scheduler, which takes full control over a CPU
core and only returns to the platform OS once all AIO module threads are not
RUNNING/RUNNABLE. During this time, all interrupts assigned to the platform
OS are masked and cannot be delivered on the CPU core. For practical deployment
of AIO, the scheduler should be changed to cooperate with the scheduler in the
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platform OS, such that all platform OS threads are not considered strictly lower
priority than AIO threads.
6.2 Final Thoughts
As more aspects of our lives are captured and handled by our personal devices,
it is important to reflect on how we can give users control over their devices and data.
In recent years, there have been significant improvements with respect to privacy and
security controls made available by the platform software on the personal devices.
The introduction of trusted execution environments (TEEs) on these devices has
definitely been a driving force for many of these improvements, as they provide a
way to reduce the attack surface for critical components of the software platform
through strong, hardware-enabled isolation. TEEs are used to provide a variety of
secure functionality, such as managing biometric authentication information (e.g.,
fingerprints). However, the device manufacturer has complete control over the TEE
software base. This is especially problematic due to the fact that the software base
running in the TEE operates at the most-privileged level on the device (e.g., secure
world OS in ARM TrustZone). Even if the user can control the OS and other
platform software, such control may be subverted by the TEE software.
In this dissertation, I have discussed my work to provide users with control
over their personal devices, while still enabling other principals, such as the device
manufacturer, to implement and reason about their software stack. A core tenet
of the enforcement layer is that the user has full privileges over their device. In
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SeCloak, the user can directly express their on/off control policy for peripherals (e.g.,
camera, microphone) on their personal devices, which SeCloak will reliably enforce.
In AIO, we enable users to apply more expressive policies, while also allowing users to
delegate rights to other principals (e.g., device manufacturer, applications) to apply
policies; AIO safely composes these policies, as well as software that implements
functionality in the I/O stack, via the credential system. Going forward, I believe
it is critical that we design our secure systems in a manner that provides users with
control instead of unnecessarily locking their personal devices.
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